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Abstract
The modelling of web-based applications can assist in capturing and understanding their behaviour.
The development of such applications requires the use of sound methodologies to ensure that the
intended and actual behaviour are the same.
As a verification technique, model checking can assist in finding design flaws and simplifying the
design of a web application, and as a result the design and the security of the web application can
be improved. Model checking has the advantage of using an exhaustive search of the state space of
a system to determine if the specifications are true or not in a given model.
In this thesis we present novel approaches in modelling and verifying web applications’ properties
to ensure their design correctness and security. Since the actions in web applications rely on both
the user input and the server status; we propose an approach for modelling and verifying dynamic
navigation properties. The Spin model checker has been used successfully in verifying communication
protocols. However, the current version of Spin does not support modelling time. We integrate
discrete time in the Spin model to allow the modelling of realistic properties that rely on time
constraints and to analyse the sequence of actions and time. Examining the sequence of actions in
web applications assists in understanding their behaviour in different scenarios such as navigation
errors and in the presence of an intruder. The model checker Uppaal is presented in the literature
as an alternative to Spin when modelling real-time systems. We develop models with real time
constraints in Uppaal in order to validate the results from the Spin models and to compare the
differences between modelling with real time and with discrete time as in Spin. We also compare
the complexity and expressiveness of each model checker in verifying web applications’ properties.
The web application models in our research are developed gradually to ensure their correctness and
to manage the complexities of specifying the security and navigation properties. We analyse the
compromised model to compare the differences in the sequence of actions and time with the secure
model to assist in improving early detections of malicious behaviour in web applications.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter we first discuss the challenges of web applications’ development that
lead to security and design vulnerabilities. In Section 1.2 we provide an overview
of the formal methods and present the model checking advantages over alternative
verification methods. We then present the state of problem of our research in Section
1.3. In Section 1.4 we list and discuss the research aims and objectives. In Section
1.5 we present the research methodology. In Section 1.6 we show the contributions of
our research. We conclude with a structure of the following chapters in Section 1.8.
1.1 Web Applications
Web applications are common in today’s economic and social life. Such applications
provide business services to customers, business to business communications, and
various services to users around the world. Online businesses use web applications
to reach more clients and to improve their services. Sectors such as banking, travel,
education and governmental services rely on web applications to promote and increase
1
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their operations [Ginige and Murugesan, 2001, Homma et al., 2011, Miao and Zeng,
2007]. The rapid spread of web applications in the areas of communications and
business services has promoted them to one of the leading and most essential branches
of the software development industry [Offutt, 2002]. Along with the increased demand
for web applications, concerns have been raised about design flaws that are able to
cause vulnerabilities in security and navigation properties [Huang and Lee, 2005].
The development of web applications has been evolving rapidly, resulting in poor
quality, security vulnerabilities and maintenance challenges [Murugesan and Desh-
pande, 2002]. Unstable design and development processes, as well as poor project
management practices are the main reasons for such problems [Ginige, 2002]. The
data handled by web applications often contains sensitive values (e.g. credit card
numbers) for both users and service providers. In 2015, the attack of several or-
ganizations’ web applications was considered the most popular method that led to
sensitive data disclosure [Hesseldahl, 2015, Solutions, 2015].
Web application vulnerabilities, which lead to the compromise of sensitive information,
are regularly reported [Falk et al., 2008, Jovanovic et al., 2006], as indicated by the
following reports:
• According to a report by [Cenzic, 2014], 96% of tested web applications in 2013
had vulnerabilities categorised as high risk. In addition, an average number of
14 vulnerabilities per web application found in 2013 due to design errors.
• A recent report by [Hoff, 2013] showed that there were more than 800 reported
hacking incidents in 2012 alone, and 70% of those were carried out through web
application vulnerabilities.
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• A study carried out by [Falk et al., 2008] showed that 75% of online banking
web sites have at least one major security flaw.
• In 2010, more than 8,000 online banking clients’ credentials were stolen from a
server where they were stored as plain text [Fundation, 2010].
A report by [Solutions, 2015] stated: “ by tracking user behaviour and using some
form of fraud detection to get an early warning of suspicious behaviour ...can help to
identify malicious activity before your last bit of sensitive data is fully exfiltrated.”
Larger and more complex web applications will also increase the need for rigorous
methods of developing high quality applications that are secure and easy to maintain
[Lee and Shirani, 2004, Ricca and Tonella, 2001, Taylor et al., 2002]. The develop-
ment of such applications requires the use of sound methodologies to ensure that the
intended and actual behaviour are the same. Also, web applications must satisfy es-
sential security properties, such as authentication, session management and navigation
properties [Stock et al., 2014].
In this thesis we apply model checking for the simulation and verification of time
sensitive web applications. We model security and navigation properties which include
session management properties, authentication properties and control flow properties.
We use the model checking tools Spin [Holzmann, 2004] and Uppaal [Amnell et al.,
2001] to verify an online banking web application of a client communicating with a
server to complete a transaction.
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1.2 Formal Methods
Formal methods are mathematical based languages, techniques and tools for verify-
ing hardware and software systems. The process of using formal methods does not
guarantee the correctness of a given system, but they can assist in increasing the un-
derstanding of a system’s inconsistencies and incompleteness that can lead to design
errors [Clarke and Wing, 1996].
Traditional validation techniques, such as testing, can be effective in the early stages
of debugging. However, testing can not detect all the errors and in some cases it can
miss errors in systems that have very large number of states, as the testing process
can only explore part of the possible behaviour of the system. Furthermore, it is
not evident when they have reached their limit, nor is there a clear estimate of the
remaining number of bugs [Clarke et al., 1999, Donini et al., 2006].
In contrast, theorem proving and proof checking do not have this shortcoming. How-
ever, they are time consuming and often require that the design team includes an ex-
pert in both the language used to model the system and the mathematical background
of the language. In addition, theorem proving is complex when timing requirements
are included in verification [Davis, 2000].
An alternative approach is formal verification, which can exhaustively explore the
possible behaviour of a system. In contrast to testing, where only some parts of
the behaviour are explored, formal verification can show that a design is correct by
exploring all possible states; thus not allowing a security vulnerability or design flaw
[Clarke et al., 1999].
Model checking tools have played a key role in the design of concurrent and distributed
systems and have also been reported in industrial applications [Baier et al., 2008,
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Clarke, 2008, Holzmann, 2004]. The model checking process assists designers to ensure
the correctness of a system in the early stages of development.
In order for a model checking tool to verify a web application model, three main tasks
need to be carried out. The first task is modelling, in which the systems’ design
is converted into a formalism that is accepted by the model checker tool. In some
cases, this is a straightforward task, while complex systems may require the use of
abstraction to eliminate unrelated or non-essential system details.
The second task is specification; stating the properties of the model that the system
must satisfy. Model checking tools commonly use temporal logic, which can assert how
the behaviour of the system evolves over time. The final task is verification. Ideally,
this task is performed in a completely automated fashion. The model checker tool
will provide an error trace (counterexample) that assists in locating where an error
occurred in the case of a negative result. Each of these are examined and demonstrated
further in Chapter 2.
Model checking has two important advantages over other techniques [Baier et al.,
2008, Clarke, 2008, Clarke et al., 1999]:
• The process is fully automatic, so the user does not need to be an expert in
mathematical disciplines such as logic and theorem proving.
• The model checker tool provides a (counterexample) that shows where the er-
ror has occurred if the property fails. This error trace provides an insight to
understand the reason for the error, as well as essential clues to fix the problem.
The main disadvantage of model checking is the state explosion problem where the
number of states of a system to be analysed or verified increases significantly in the
state space [Holzmann, 2004, McMillan, 1992, Valmari, 1998].
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1.3 State of the Problem
Web applications are dynamically changing and evolving. They are used in services
such as banking, governmental and health sectors [Homma et al., 2011, Huang and
Lee, 2005, Krishnamurthi, 2006], as web application often involve the transmission of
sensitive data and they need to ensure correctness to avoid vulnerabilities. Security is
a major concern for developers, since simple errors could lead to the loss of valuable
information and threaten the privacy of online users. As a result, the need for auto-
mated tools that detect vulnerabilities and protect users against attacks is evident.
Verifying web applications using model checking is an emerging research area, and
there is a clear gap between the theory and practice. This research investigates web
application behaviour under different situations (e.g. in the presence of an attacker
or different server status). Realistic web application models are built and extended
with time constraints to verify and analyse their behaviour.
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives
In this research we apply model checking for modelling and verifying web application
behaviour under different scenarios. In particular, the focus is on web application
security and navigation properties. This aim can be achieved by fulfilling three inter-
connected objectives, as follows:
• Develop web application models that extend and verify its properties by adding
time constraints to achieve realistic models. In addition, secure models will be
investigated and compared with a model in the presence of an attacker to study
the weaknesses of the specifications and the sequence of timing and actions.
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The results could capture the behaviour of the attacker in order to identify
vulnerabilities in the models and to analyse compromised and secure models.
• Apply model checking to verify web applications’ behaviour and compare it with
other verification methods.
• Finally, we present a critical review of the formal methods and investigate the
landscape of web application modelling and verification techniques.
In this thesis we present a novel approach for the modelling of web applications.
We gradually include features to the models in verify additional properties in each
model. We integrate discrete time in the Spin model checker [Holzmann, 2004] to
model properties that rely on time constraints. The advantage of using discrete time
is that we were able to capture the value of time at each step in order to compare the
behaviour of different models. Uppaal [Amnell et al., 2001] uses real time modelling,
which we first use to validate the results obtained from the Spin. Secondly, we
compare both tools in the context of verifying web applications.
1.5 Research Methodology
Modelling can provide significant benefits to web application development. The view
of a system shifts from basic implementation to more detailed aspects, such as security
that will improve the quality of the final product. Model checking assists in under-
standing the interactions and states of web applications, reducing design flaws and
ensuring consistent conditions and well-defined behaviour [Scha¨tz, 2004]. Additional
benefits of model checking for web applications are [Baier et al., 2008, Clarke, 2008,
Clarke et al., 1999]:
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Modelling phase: Describing and analysing the high-level, abstract and non-deterministic
behaviour of the application avoids the cost of implementation details that could
complicate the design. Errors can be caught more easily earlier in a less expen-
sive development phase.
Properties definition The properties of the web application model to be verified
are defined by using temporal logic formulas, for example in Spin the Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) [Burstall, 1974, Kro¨ger, 1977, Pnueli, 1981] is used, while
Uppaal uses a subset of the Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [Huth and Ryan,
2006].
Simulation phase: Using simulation and verification to analyse the model and in-
teractions, we identify potential issues, such as the undesired behaviour of the
system and modelling errors.
Verification phase: In this phase we verify that the model guarantees the properties
of the system in different scenarios. If the property fails, the model checking fail-
ure analysis assists in finding the error through a trace. We either use temporal
logic formulas or simple assertions.
Figure 1.1 shows the process we will use in Chapters 3 and 4 to analyse and verify
the properties of web applications.
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Figure 1.1: Model Checking Web Application Properties.
According to [Fenton and Bieman, 2014], a formal experiment is a rigorous and con-
trolled investigation of a model in which important variables are identified and changed
such that the outcome can be validated. [Mendes and Mosley, 2006] stated that for-
mal investigation is best suited to the web applications research community, as it is
applicable across various types of projects and processes. In a formal investigation a
variable is manipulated such that all possible variable value are validated.
The formal analysis framework used in this research consists of four components. The
application and properties are expressed using formal semantics. A formal language
is then used to describe the system. Next, a formal language is used to describe the
property under analysis. Finally, a formal technique checks whether the application
satisfies the property.
In our research, we are interested in the verification of the applications’ behaviour
properties, rather than the data transmission properties. We model both web page
transactions and the input of web applications, as the dynamic nature of web appli-
cations means that the input could lead to different pages (e.g. wrong authentication
credentials). The dynamic nature of web applications could be affected by different
input from the user, or by the server state.
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As spin does not support the modelling of time constraints, it will be extended with
discrete time, enabling the construction of realistic web application models. In the
model checking of timed models, discrete time is preferred to reduce the risk of state
space explosion [Valmari, 1998], which is one drawback of model checking. Modelling
with real time could result in an increase of the system’s states up to an intractable
level. The state space explosion problem will be discussed in Chapter 2.
1.6 Contributions
In this thesis, we made the following contributions:
• The challenges in adopting model checking for the analysis and verification of
web applications are critically reviewed. The usage of model checking is ex-
amined for critical properties of web applications, such as security, navigation
and time-sensitive properties. After providing background information on the
current challenges in verifying web applications, methods are devised to develop
more secure and easy-to-maintain web applications. In Chapter 2 we present
and discuss the challenges in more detail.
• We design a novel web application model and extend it with the novel approach
of time constraints to enable the modelling of web application properties. The
time constraints assist in time stamping the messages exchanged between par-
ties in the communication and also in the analysis of the sequence of actions. By
adding time we are able to express properties, such as modelling session manage-
ment properties and dynamic navigation properties, where a timeout can lead
to different pages. Chapter 3 describes the steps in modelling time constraints.
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• We develop web application models in the Spin model checker. We first analyse
the models without time constraints to understand the difference when we add
time and to ensure the correctness of the models. We then model dynamic
navigation properties by showing how different input from both sides could affect
the simulation and verification process. We then introduce a novel approach
for modelling the discrete time process so we can model further time-related
properties such as session management properties. Finally, we add an intruder to
the model to analyse the behaviour of the system in different scenarios. Chapter
3 describes the modelling steps in further detail.
• By analysing the time sequence and action sequence within a web application
session, we can identify the difference between a secure session and a compro-
mised session, with the presence of an intruder. Understanding the web appli-
cation behaviour in different scenarios leads to an improved security and more
stable development. Furthermore, our approach can assist in developing meth-
ods to detect malicious behaviour at early stages. This is analysed in Chapter
4.
• In addition to modelling the static properties of web applications, a novel ap-
proach was developed for modelling the dynamic properties of web applications,
in which a single input can lead to different pages based on time constraints and
server state. As highlighted in the literature review, there is a gap in modelling
the dynamic navigation properties of web applications. Our research shows how
it is possible to model web applications using the model checking tool’s existing
capabilities, resulting in simplified models that contain security and navigation
properties. We present the models in further detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter
4.
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• We verify web applications’ properties in the Uppaal real-time model checker.
Uppaal has a graphical editor which makes it easy to design a system model,
along with a graphical simulator that shows the possible dynamic behaviour of
a system description. We compare the models in Chapter 5.
• A comparison was made between the Spin and Uppaal model checkers for
web application analysis and verification. This comparison aims to answer the
following questions:
– What is the complexity and expressiveness level of the model checking tool
to verify the properties of web applications models?
– To what extent can the property specification language be adapted to the
specification of web application properties?
– How capable is the model checker for verifying models without resulting in
a state explosion problem?
– How are the results different when integrating a simple timing constraint
into Spin, in contrast to Uppaal, which is based on timed automata spec-
ifications?
The outcome results validate the rationale for using model checking in web
application development, as explained in Chapter 5.
1.7 Publications
Part of the work presented in this thesis has been published and presented in peer-
reviewed conferences and workshops:
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1. Alzahrani,M. & Georgieva, L. (2012) Modelling Trusted Web Applications. 1st
International Workshop on Trustworthy Multi-Agent Systems. KES-AMSTA
Special Session, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 25-27 June.
2. Alzahrani,M. & Georgieva, L. (2012) Analysing Data-Sensitive and Time-Sensitive
Web Applications at the 19th Automated Reasoning Workshop, University of
Manchester. 2nd-4th April.
3. Alzahrani,M. & Georgieva, L. (2013) Comparative analysis of time-sensitive
web applications using Spin and Uppaal at the 20th Automated Reasoning
Workshop, University of Dundee on 11-12 April.
4. Alzahrani,M. (2015) Model Checking Web Applications using Spin and Uppaal
at 15th International Workshop on Automated Verification of Critical Systems,
Edinburgh, 1-4 September.
1.8 Structure of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 summarises the background on web application fundamentals and prop-
erties, and provides a comparison of the analysis and verification methods found
in the literature. Model checking and the tools used in this research are then
described, as a basis for subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 presents the first model checker, Spin. First the tool and its input lan-
guage Promela are described. Second, the web application is modelled, and
Chapter 1. Introduction 14
a description of the steps followed during the modelling and verification is pro-
vided. The secure and compromised models are presented, and then the simu-
lation and verification results are shown.
Chapter 4 describes the second model checking tool, Uppaal. First a brief de-
scription of the tool is presented, followed by background information on timed
automata theory as a basis for modelling web applications. A comparison of the
secure and compromised models is made, and subsequently, the simulation and
verification results are provided.
Chapter 5 provides a comparison between the results obtained from Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4. The results of the experiments are analysed, illustrating the differ-
ences between the tools, as well as the challenges of modelling web applications.
Chapter 6 assesses the results that were obtained and presents conclusions, contri-
butions, limitations and possible future work.
f
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter describes the development process of web applications and the challenges
arising in both the design and implementation phases. We then outline evolving trends
and discuss related work. We then present an overview of model checking principles for
web applications. Moreover, we list the verification requirements for web applications.
The OWASP Application Security Verification Standard [Stock et al., 2014], which is
updated annually, is used to illustrate a list of verification properties. This chapter
provides the research context and lays the foundation for the modelling and analysis
work described in the next chapters.
2.1 Web Applications
Web applications enable much of today’s online business; including banking, social
networking and governmental activities, to thrive. As a result of the rapid develop-
ment of new programming models and technologies, web applications are evolving
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continuously. The results of such rapid change for web applications brings new chal-
lenges [Alpuente et al., 2010, Armando et al., 2010, Conallen, 1999, Di Sciascio et al.,
2003].
The security of web applications is a challenging task. Security is a continuous process
of identifying and analysing potential threats [MSDN, 2011].
Furthermore, new security challenges emerge due to the increasing amount of appli-
cation code being moved to the client’s side. With larger amounts of code exposed to
the user comes greater vulnerability risks. Attackers are able to gain knowledge of the
code and are therefore, more likely to compromise the server-side application state.
The data protected by web applications are security sensitive in most cases, including
credit card details and personal information, and are typically significantly valuable
for both users and service providers. Emerging types of attacks, such as the HTTP
parameter pollution attack, place a wider range of web applications at risk [Balduzzi
et al., 2011]. As a result, major companies offer rewards for finding vulnerabilities
within their web applications [Google, 2015].
This inherent complexity poses challenges to the modelling, analysis and verification
of this type of application. Some of these challenges are summarised below [Alalfi
et al., 2009, Li and Xue, 2014]:
• The complex nature of the web application environment may lead to integration
difficulties with other diverse hardware and software platforms. The analysis of
many components could make the verification extremely difficult.
• The dynamic behaviour, such as the dynamic interaction between clients and
servers, and the continual changes in the system’s context and web technologies
can be another major challenge.
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• Web applications may have several entry points, allowing interaction with the
system in a way that cannot be predicted (due to design errors) and that cannot
be blocked by the web application.
• Another challenge is the efficient monitoring and tracking of outputs of web
applications. Examining the change of states between different components is
often difficult to analyse.
The early websites only contained a collection of documents with static content, en-
coded in the HyperText Markup Language (HTML). Since then, web applications
have evolved from static hypermedia to complex and dynamic infrastructures. In ad-
dition, development technologies shifts the focus of web applications from information
delivery only, to include application execution [Casteleyn et al., 2009].
New technologies have been developed to enable web applications to change from
simple static HTML pages to dynamic web pages that are able to interact with other
systems [Casteleyn et al., 2009, Conallen, 1999]. Web pages and various elements of
web applications are stored on the server. Users primarily interact with the browser;
the request from the client’s side is sent to the web server and in turn to the database
management system. Servers respond to the user’s request and carry out data pro-
cessing to complete the transaction. The processed results are then returned to the
user via the web browser.
Web applications are commonly designed as a three-tiered architecture (shown in
Figure 2.1) and consist of the following components:
Web browser is the software application that serves as a user interface for presenting
information.
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Web application server manages the dynamic flow-control of the web application.
The web application server receives user input via the web browser and results
from the database server. The code is constructed dynamically and the challenge
arises when checking or modifying the incoming data before processing it or when
passing it to the lower tiers for execution. Failure in this process can lead to
compromising the security of the web application.
Database server provides management and database persistent functionality.
Figure 2.1: Overview of Web Applications [Li and Xue, 2014]
Accordingly, the features that differentiate web applications from traditional software
and information systems can be summarised below [Casteleyn et al., 2009, Fraternali,
1999]:
• Accessibility: Users with different levels of computing skills and with different
needs are able to access web applications.
• Data management: The data in web applications is distributed in different for-
mats and using various technologies.
• Architecture complexity: Web application accessibility requires distributed, multi-
tier architectures to access the full range of information and services.
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2.1.1 Security Threats for Web Applications
Web applications are built on complex systems consisting of various components and
technologies. The current web application development and testing frameworks offer
limited support for security validation. Web application development is an error-prone
process, and the implementation of security metrics requires substantial effort [Alalfi
et al., 2009]. Security relies on the following attributes [MSDN, 2011]:
• Authentication: The process of knowing who is accessing the information on the
server. All principals of a communication need to prove their identities in order
to gain access.
• Authorization: The process of controlling the information and actions that an
authenticated principal is permitted to access.
• Auditing: Developing effective auditing prevent clients from denying their trans-
actions.
• Integrity: Ensuring that transmitted data is protected from accidental or delib-
erate malicious modification.
• Confidentiality: Ensuring that the data remains private and confidential from
unauthorized users or eavesdroppers who monitor the flow of traffic across a
network.
• Availability: Ensuring that systems remain available for legitimate users. Denial
of service attacks cause the system to crash so that other users cannot gain
access.
A large number of web applications deployed on the Internet are open to security
vulnerabilities. According to a report by [Cenzic, 2014], 96% of tested web applications
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in 2013 had vulnerabilities categorised as “ high risk”. In addition, in 2013 an average
of 14 vulnerabilities was estimated per web application. A recent report by [Hoff,
2013] showed that in 2012 alone there were more than 800 reported hacking incidents;
70% of those were carried out by exploring web application vulnerabilities.
Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of web applications with respective different common
types of vulnerabilities. This increases the difficulty of finding a universal solution
for each type, as each one requires a different fix. The three main categories of
threats were: session management vulnerabilities; (found in 79% of web applications
in 2013); Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities; (60%); and authentication and
authorisation vulnerabilities (56%).
Figure 2.2: Percentage of Common Vulnerability Types in Web Applications
[Cenzic, 2014]
The development of web applications requires careful consideration with a focus on
security and navigation correctness. The use of model-based verification assists in
capturing the system’s behaviour. Furthermore, model-based verification can simplify
future analysis in order to improve or measure the quality of the system.
In addition, modelling plays an important role during the the software development
phase by formally defining the requirements and providing exhaustive detail. A cen-
tral goal of model-based development is to enable an analysis of the system, thus
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ensuring quality at model level. There is a need to consider certain properties of the
system prior to implementation, such as deadlock freedom, timing consistency and
the availability of memory resources [Engels et al., 2003].
Following traditional software verification, the use of forward engineering-based ver-
ification simplifies the development process and establishes a basis for later phases,
such as verification. On the other hand, the use of reverse engineering methods
to extract models from existing applications simplifies maintenance and evaluation.
Forward-engineering verification employed in early development stages enables error
detection, alleviating the costs and effort of rectification with respect to errors in later
development stages [Huth and Ryan, 2006].
Web application modelling is viewed from different perspectives based on the purpose
of the verification.
In order to present and discuss the level of modelling and the scope of properties under
this research, we will demonstrate and discuss primary web application properties and
the attempts of both researchers and the industry to ensure correctness.
According to a survey carried out by [Alalfi et al., 2009], the level of web applications
modelling can be viewed from three perspectives: web navigation, web behaviour and
web content. Web content properties are outside the scope of this research, since they
mostly rely on checking the programming language and content components used.
The other two perspectives of web properties; web navigation and web behaviour are
discussed, along with related work, in the following sections.
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2.2 Web Navigation Properties
Navigation within a web application is key to ensuring both its security and usability
[Kappel et al., 2006]. The web navigation properties are divided into three categories.
First, static navigation properties address properties such as broken links, reachability
(e.g., links to home page), consistency of frame structure and cost of navigation, such
as the longest path analysis.
Second are dynamic navigation properties, whereby some links may lead to different
web pages depending on the input. Input can be provided by either the user or the
system. The action then depends on the server that uses information, such as session
information, time or date, to apply access control and user privileges.
The third category of properties is interaction navigation analysis, which focuses on
properties outside the control of the web application, such as user interaction with
the web browser, e.g., the back and forward buttons. Table 2.1 lists an example of
navigation properties.
Property Description
d1 The page is reachable from the top page and always has a next page in
the transition.
d2 Every page is reachable from the top page.
d3 The top page is reachable from all pages.
d4 Eventually a chosen-page is visited.
d5 The first page is the login-page and the next page is either the login-
error-page or the home-page.
d6 Whenever the login-page is visited, the next page is either the login-error-
page or the login-success-page.
Table 2.1: Navigation Properties [Stock et al., 2014].
The work of [Homma et al., 2011] uses the Spin model checker [Holzmann, 2004] to
model web application navigation properties. The authors propose a method to use
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two finite state automata, with the first representing page transitions and the second
modelling the internal state transitions of the web application.
[Castelluccia et al., 2006, Di Sciascio et al., 2003] modelled web applications as a
directed graph in which pages, links, windows and actions are represented as states.
The implemented prototype system embeds a component which automatically imports
web applications design from a UML tool; and then Computational Tree Logic (CTL)
specifications are added and translated as source code for the NuSMV model checker
[Cimatti et al., 2000]. The main advantage of this method is the ability to perform
a priori verification of the web application design by applying the verification process
to the UML-design of the web application in a single automated process using the
verification tool WAver.
[Ricca and Tonella, 2000, 2001] propose a model of web applications using a UML
class diagram. The model is used for reachability checking and semi-automatic test
case generation.
[Han and Hofmeister, 2006] present an approach that uses state charts to formally
model the adaptive navigation of web applications and checks for unreachable web
pages. This model only focuses on user mode (e.g., whether the user is logged in or
not) and page history (e.g., what pages the user has previously visited).
The work of [Haydar et al., 2005] proposes a way to discriminate states of interest by
introducing a specialised operator for Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), which is used to
verify web applications. This focuses more on the distinction of states; rather than
on the modelling of web applications.
In [Yuen et al., 2006], the authors propose a behavioural model of web applications,
called Web Automata, which is based on the Model, View and Control (MVC) model
architecture. They model the behaviour of a web application with dynamic content
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as an extension of links-automata with the constraint logic feature of Extended Finite
Automata (EFA). They also present a testing framework for web applications based
on the behavioural model.
In [Haydar et al., 2004] the authors present a formal approach for modelling web
applications using communicating automata. They observe the external behaviour
of an explored part of a web application using a monitoring tool. The observed
behaviour is then converted into communicating automata representing all windows,
frames and frame sets of the application being tested by intercepting HTTP requests
and responses using a proxy server. Their model differs from the one proposed in this
research, as it focuses on external behaviour.
The approaches described in this section use either the graph-based model or UML
to represent the navigation properties of a web application. UML is considered as the
modelling standard for a wide range of applications and systems [Alalfi et al., 2009].
However, UML is not a suitable method for the verification of web applications as the
models need to be translated into formal specifications. The alternative method is to
use graph-based modelling methods that can be directly translated to a verification
form that is accepted by model checking tools. From the research listed in this section,
we identify the need for a sound method that also includes the dynamic behaviour of
web applications.
2.3 Web Security Properties
Since web applications are developed with availability across the Internet their se-
curity is a major concern for developers and users [Huang and Lee, 2005, McClure
et al., 2003, Tracy et al., 2002]. Web application developers review web application
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vulnerabilities regularly. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is
concerned with web application security, and publishes a list of the most recent attacks
of web applications each year [OWASP, 2013], as well as general guidance for building
and verifying web applications. In addition, technical reports are published by other
organisations, such as Microsoft, which focus on developing secure web applications
using the .NET framework [Microsoft, 2011]. The Web Applications Security Con-
sortium (WASC) published a report on security threat classifications [WASC, 2011],
summarising the most common security threats of web applications.
The modelling of web behaviour properties is divided into two categories. The first
category is security properties, which focuses on access control and session control
mechanisms. Security properties are related to navigation properties. For example, a
wrongly designed navigation link could lead to unauthorised access to sensitive infor-
mation in the web application. The second category of web behaviour is instruction
processing properties ; this type of modelling addresses issues related to execution and
state changes at both ends, without communicating with each other.
Predicting the kinds of attacks that could affect the security of a web application
is challenging when observing the diversity of these attacks. However, by modelling
specific web application properties, it is possible to model the cause and effects of the
attacks [Corin et al., 2003].
According to a survey by [Li and Xue, 2014], the three primary security aspects that
should be considered to achieve an accepted level of security are:
• User inputs are potentially dangerous and cannot be trusted in an open envi-
ronment. Thus, input validation is an essential aspect of the web application
Chapter 2. Background and Literature Review 26
security to detect untrusted user inputs. Due to the unique features of web ap-
plications in contrast with other applications, input validation is a challenging
task.
• It is equally as important to employ session management to correlate web re-
quests from the same user into one web session during a certain period of time.
Communication between a user and a server is carried out through HTTP, which
is a stateless protocol. As a result, multiple inputs from the same user are
processed as independent requests originating from multiple users of the web
application. The session variables can be stored either at the client side (via
cookies) or at the server side (using files or databases). In the latter case, a
unique identifier session ID is assigned to index the explicit session variables,
which are stored at the server side and issued to the client.
• Additionally, the implementation of control flow between the user and server
must be accurate to protect sensitive information. This can be achieved ex-
plicitly through source code security checks or implicitly through the navigation
paths presented to users. Security checks examine the state of a web application
by relying on session variables and persistent objects in the database before re-
vealing sensitive information to the user. Authentication and authorisation are
the most common mechanisms for control flow in data-sensitive web applica-
tions, enabling an application to restrict its sensitive information and privileged
operations from authorised users.
In this research, the focus is on the three primary aspects of session management,
authentication properties and control flow properties. The remainder of this chapter
describes and discusses the aforementioned security aspects and the most common
attacks that can exploit vulnerabilities.
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2.3.1 Session Management
Web application session management is essential to track and record user input and to
maintain accurate application states. Session management is accomplished through
collaboration between the client and the server. The simplest approach is for the
server to send a unique identifier (i.e. session ID) to the client.
Since the session ID is the sole proof of the client’s identity, its confidentiality, au-
thenticity and integrity need to be secured in order to avoid session hijacking. First,
a session ID should be randomly generated for each user’s visit and should expire
after a short period of inactivity timeout. Second, transmissions between the parties
should be protected by a secure transport layer protocol (i.e. SSL security protocol),
to ensure that attackers are unable to deduce the session ID and eventually control
the session. Finally, the user should make sure that the session ID provided by the
server is unique by not adopting a session ID from an external source. Attackers can
set a session ID to a value that is known to them.
A web session is formed as a pair of network HTTP request and response transactions
associated with the same user. Complex web applications require the retention of
information or status about each user for the duration of multiple requests [Stock
et al., 2014]. Therefore, sessions provide the ability to establish variables, such as
access rights and localisation settings, which will apply to each interaction between
the user and the web application for the duration of the session.
Web applications create sessions to keep track of anonymous users after the very
first user request. An example is saving the preferences of the user’s language. In
addition, web applications make use of sessions once the user has been authenticated.
The process ensures the ability to associate the user to any following requests, and
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also employs security access controls, enables authorised access to the user’s private
data and enhances the usability of the application.
Table 2.2 lists examples of the session management properties:
Property Description
b1 Verify that sessions are invalidated when the user logs out.
b2 Verify that sessions time-out after a specified period of inactivity.
b3 Verify that the application does not permit duplicate concurrent user
sessions, originating from different machines.
b4 Verify that sessions time-out after an administratively-configurable max-
imum time period regardless of activity (an absolute time-out).
Table 2.2: Session Management Properties [Stock et al., 2014].
2.3.2 Authentication
Authentication is the process of verifying that an individual or entity is who they
claim to be. Authentication is commonly performed by submitting a user name or
ID and one or more items of private information that only a given user should know
[Stock et al., 2014]. A session record is then created with a cookie set, which the
browser will send with each subsequent request to the application. The application
then shows data related to the authenticated user (e.g., shopping cart content, posts,
and stored files) during their use of the application. Table 2.3 lists the most important
web application (authentication properties).
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Property Description
a1 Verify that all pages and resources require authentication except those
specifically intended to be public.
a2 Verify that all authentication controls are enforced on the server side.
a3 Verify that re-authentication is required before any application-specific
sensitive operations are permitted as per the risk profile of the applica-
tion.
a4 Verify that a failure of the authentication controls ensures that attackers
cannot log in.
Table 2.3: Authentication Properties [Stock et al., 2014].
2.3.3 Control-Flow
Each web application maintains its own application control flow (also known as busi-
ness logic). Ensuring the correctness of the control flow is key to a secure web appli-
cation, and this mainly depends on the intended functionality of the application. The
main logic property is that users can only access authorised information and perform
operations allowed by the intended work flow of the web application [Li and Xue,
2014].
Web developers attempt to prevent such vulnerabilities. The interface-hiding mech-
anism, which uses the principle of security through obscurity, has been widely used
as an access control mechanism in web applications. However, this mechanism alone
is not sufficient to ensure the control flow of web applications. Attackers can simply
expose hidden links to access unauthorised information and operations. Secondly,
developers may manually use explicit security checks prior to all sensitive operations.
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It is difficult to check and anticipate all possible execution paths that may lead to a
security vulnerability. It is likely that there will be a missing security check on certain
paths that will lead vulnerabilities to be exposed to attackers.
As discussed above, control flow vulnerabilities depend on the intended purpose of a
web application. For example, an online banking website may have a certain vulnera-
bility that allows attackers to bypass vital security pages or steps. The 2013 OWASP
report states that top ten security risks for web applications [Stock et al., 2014] can be
attributed to application logic vulnerabilities (i.e. missing functional access control,
invalid redirects and/or forwards). Table 2.4 lists control-flow vulnerabilities.
Property Description
c1 Verify that the application does not allow spoofed high value transac-
tions, such as allowing Attacker User A to process a transaction as Vic-
tim User B by tampering with or replaying a session, transaction state,
transaction or user IDs.
c2 Verify that the application is protected against information disclosure
attacks, such as direct object reference, tampering, session brute force.
c3 Verify that the application will only process business logic flows in se-
quential step order, with all steps being processed in realistic human
time, and restricting out of order, skip steps, process steps from another
user, or submitting transactions too quickly.
Table 2.4: Control-Flow Properties [Stock et al., 2014].
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2.4 Model Checking
Model checking is based on a collection of techniques for the automatic analysis of a
system. A formal definition of model checking is
“ Model checking is an automated technique that, given a finite state model of a
system and a formal property, systematically checks whether this property holds for
(a given state in) that model [Baier et al., 2008].”
The model checker tool takes as input the description of the system and the properties
of that system. The system, in most cases, is defined as a finite state system, and
its properties are expressed as temporal logic formulas. The model checker verifies
whether the properties hold or not. In most cases, if a property does not hold, the
model checker provides a counterexample.
In practice, the model of the system being analysed is approximate, thus the results
are limited. Errors in the model may still remain after the verification. When applying
model checking to a system’s design, three main phases may be identified, as described
in [Baier et al., 2008, Clarke, 2008, Clarke et al., 1999]:
• Modelling Phase. The modelling phase consists of modelling the system in a
language acceptable to the one used by the model checker, then using the sim-
ulation on the model and finally using the property specification language to
formalise the property to be checked.
• Running Phase. The system is checked to see if the properties defined using the
model checker hold.
Chapter 2. Background and Literature Review 32
• Analysis Phase. This phase checks whether the properties specified are satisfied
or not. Depending on the result, the model is then refined, the properties are
re-designed and the process is repeated.
Figure 2.3: Model Checking Process.
Figure 2.3 gives an overview of the model checking approach. The requirements of
the system under consideration are first identified and these requirements are then
formalised in a property specification language. The system is then modelled in a
language acceptable to the model checker. A combination of the model and the
properties of the model are fed into the model checker. The model checker outputs
the results as ‘satisfied’ if no property is ‘violated,’ or ‘violated’ if a property fails. To
build any model for verification purposes, there are guidelines to be followed, in order
to correctly model the system under consideration.
The problem of model checking can easily be stated as defined by [Clarke, 2008]:
Let M be a Kripke structure [Kripke, 2007] which is graphical transition system that
represent the behaviour of a system . Let f be a formula of temporal logic (i.e. the
specification). Find all states s of M such that M,s |= f (see Figure 2.3). The term
model refers to whether the structure M was a model for the formula f. It does imply
the abstract model of the system under study.
Some of the main advantages of model checking over other verification techniques,
such as automated theorem proving or proof checking [Clarke, 2008], are:
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• The checking process is automatic. Users need to enter a formal description of
the system model and its specifications and the model checking tool will produce
a result.
• Model checking is faster than traditional verification techniques (i.e. testing),
and therefore it saves time and expense.
• The model checker produces a counterexample if the specification is not satisfied.
Counterexamples are important to show the reason why the specification does
not hold; this assists in the debugging of complex systems.
• It can evaluate partial specifications. In complex systems, model checking can
be used during the design phase.
• Temporal logic can express essential properties for reasoning about concurrent
systems.
In contrast, one of the main disadvantages of model checking is the state explosion
problem, since model checking searches the state space of a system, which may increase
exponentially with the system’s description size.
This problem comes from having so many possible, interleaved interactions between
processes that the state space grows exponentially compared to the number of pro-
cesses. If such behaviour is inherent to the system, the only way out of it is to use
bit-state hashing, which implies only partial checking of the state space. This is based
on the idea that the presence of errors is easier to detect than their absence [Bosnacki,
1998, Clarke, 2008]. Partial-order reduction, which is used by the Spin model checker,
is one of the most effective solutions to this problem [Clarke, 2008]. Partial-order re-
duction means that instead of generating all possible, interleaving execution paths
in the state space, it is possible to generate only representatives of certain classes of
Chapter 2. Background and Literature Review 34
execution paths. As [Holzmann, 1997] describes, the reduction is based on the obser-
vation that the validity of an LTL formula is often insensitive to the order in which
concurrent or independently executed events are interleaved in the depth-first search.
This makes it possible to record state changes and in this way to ascertain that two
different paths of execution are the same, which in turn enables the verifier to remove
the other paths, as they would not contribute anything new to the verification. In
contrast, state compression means simply compressing the state data, which naturally
incurs runtime overhead. Both partial-order reduction and state compression are
guaranteed not to make the system states unreachable [Holzmann, 1997].
2.4.1 Model Checking Tools
Model checking tools are being developed continuously in both industry and the re-
search community. Tools such as ProVerif [Blanchet, 2001], Scyther [Cremers,
2008], NuSMV [Cimatti et al., 2000] and Tamarin [Meier et al., 2013] are examples
of model checking tools used for the verification of security protocols and can provide
simulation and verification of their properties. Each of the tools has a different level of
ability to model specific properties of the system under verification. Moreover, tools
such as ProVerif provide support for modelling intruders and cryptographic primitives.
The Spin model checker [Holzmann, 2004] is the primary tool used in this research;
it was chosen for its simplicity and high degree of expressiveness. In contrast to
other model checkers, Spin has the ability to provide insights into the first stages of
modelling through its simulation charts. Since Spin does not support the modelling
of time we integrate discrete time into the models.
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The second model checker used in our research is Uppaal [Amnell et al., 2001].
Uppaal is used for the verification of real-time systems. The graphical editor of
Uppaal makes it easy to design a system model, along with a graphical simulator
that shows the possible dynamic behaviour of a system description.
2.5 Temporal Logic
Temporal logics are used to describe event sequences in time without the explicit use
of time. Temporal logics were developed to investigate how time is used in natural lan-
guage arguments by philosophers and linguists [Clarke, 2008, Hughes and Cresswell,
1996]. This work uses two model checking tools: the Spin model checker uses LTL,
while the Uppaal model checker use CTL for verification [Burstall, 1974, Kro¨ger,
1977, Pnueli, 1981].
The usage of temporal logics for reasoning about systems was proposed by [Burstall,
1974, Kro¨ger, 1977, Pnueli, 1981]. The two most-used branches of temporal logic
are the Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) and the Computation Tree Logic (CTL).
LTL considers every event in time as having a unique possible future; the events are
checked over a classical timeline. In contrast, CTL expresses each moment in time
as having several possible futures. Thus, CTL views the structure of time as a tree,
rooted in the current time with any number of branching paths from each node of
the tree. LTL and CTL have a common subset of properties, but neither of them
completes the other one. Properties exist that are expressible in LTL but cannot be
expressed in CTL, and vice versa. CTL* is another temporal logic that contains both
LTL and CTL.
Commonly, three different types of properties are distinguished in verification:
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Safety Property: Describes a behaviour that may not occur on any path (”Some-
thing bad may not happen”). In order to verify a safety property, all execution paths
need to be exhaustively checked.
Invariance Property: Describes a behaviour that must hold on all paths.
Liveness Property: A liveness property implies that ”something good eventually
happens”, and a certain state will always be reached in a system.
2.5.1 Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [Fisher, 2011, Holzmann, 1997, Venema, 2001] reasons
over linear traces through time. At each time instant, there is only one real future
state that will occur. Traditionally, that timeline is defined as starting “now,” in the
current time step, and progressing infinitely into the future.
Syntax of LTL formulas are composed of a finite set Prop of atomic proposition vari-
ables (denoted by letters p, q,...), the Boolean connectives ¬,∧,∨,→ and the temporal
connectives U(until), X (next time), G (globally, also known as the  sample) and F
(eventually, also known as the ♦ sample). Intuitively, the Xϕ states that ϕ is true in
the next time step after the current one. The ϕUψ states that either ψ is true now or
ϕ is true now and ϕ remains true until such a time when ψ holds. Finally, ϕ means
that ϕ is true in every step, while ♦ϕ designates that ϕ must either be true now or
at some future time step. Table 2.5 lists all the operators used in LTL formulas and
their equivalent used in the Spin model checker verification:
Formally, an LTL formula ϕ has the following syntax, where p is an atomic proposition
from some set atoms:
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Operator Math or Logic spin
not ¬ or p !
and ∧ &&
or ∨ ||
implies → − >
equivalent ↔ < − >
until U U
always or globally  or G []
eventually or in the future ♦ or F <>
next X X
Table 2.5: LTL formula operators with their mathematical and spin notation
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Gϕ | Fϕ | Uϕ | Xϕ
For example, we verify a navigation property “ the home page is always followed by
an account page” in a web application model. We use the LTL formula in 2.1 where
p is defined in the Spin model checker as the home page and q as the account page
and ♦ means eventually.
([](p− ><> q)) (2.1)
More properties will be expressed in LTL later in Chapter 3.
2.5.2 Computational Tree Logic (CTL)
Computational Tree Logic (CTL)[Fisher, 2011] is a branching time logic that reasons
over many possible traces through time. Unlike LTL, for which every time instance
has exactly one immediate successor, CTL has a finite, non-zero number of immediate
Chapter 2. Background and Literature Review 38
successors. CTL was the first logic to be used in model checking [Clarke and Emerson,
1982]. The CTL branching timeline starts in the current time step and may progress
to any one of potentially many possible infinite futures. Furthermore, in reasoning
along a timeline, CTL operators must also reason and include all possible branches.
CTL is similar to LTL, in so far as the temporal operators are all two-part operators,
with one part specifying the location to occur along a future timeline and another
specifying whether this action takes place on at least one branch or all branches. The
path operators are:
• A: On all future paths, starting from the initial state.
• E: On some future paths, starting from the initial state.
The second model checker used in this research, Uppaal, uses a simplified subset of
CTL. The properties of web applications are expressed in CTL.
For the purpose of understanding the logical expressiveness of LTL and CTL in verify-
ing web application properties, we consider the differences between the logics. [Vardi,
2001] states that the linear and branching time logics correspond to two distinct views
of time, and therefore LTL and CTL are expressively incomparable. In general, CTL
allows explicit existential quantification over paths, which gives it an expressive na-
ture in cases where there is a need to reason about the possibility of the existence of
a specific path through the transition system Model M. This includes instances such
as when M is best modelled as a computation tree, such as the dynamic nature of
multi-pages from a single page. For example, there are no LTL matches of the CTL
formulae A Xp, since LTL cannot express the possibility of p occurring on some path
but not all paths next time or in the future. Moreover, it is impossible to express in
LTL scenarios where distinct behaviour on distinct branches occurs at the same time.
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On the other hand, it is difficult to use the CTL logic in situations where the same
behaviour may occur on distinct branches at distinct times; here the ability of LTL
to describe individual paths is important and useful. [Vardi, 2001] explains that the
former rarely happens, and LTL is found to be more expressive in other ways than
CTL.
A further comparison between the logics will be discussed in Chapter 5.
2.5.3 Temporal Logic Patterns
Temporal logic formalisms are commonly used to describe states and event sequences
in systems. Defining temporal formulas can be a straight-forward process if the prop-
erty is small. However, when there is a need to verify complex properties, it is advis-
able to use the formula patterns described in [Dwyer et al., 1999, Salamah et al., 2005].
Table 2.6 shows the temporal patterns that were collected from research studies:
Pattern Description
Absence A given state q does not occur within a state scope.
Existence A state q must occur within a scope.
Bounded Existence A given state q must occur a number of times in a scope.
Universality A state q must occur through the scope.
Precedence A given state p must always be preceded by a state q within a
scope.
Response A given state p must always be followed by a given state q within
a scope.
Table 2.6: Temporal Logic Patterns
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[Corbett et al., 2000] developed pattern scopes, where the execution of the temporal
formula takes place in a specified region of the scope. There are five basic scopes
where a pattern can hold:
• Globally: A given state must hold throughout the system’s execution.
• After: A given state p must occur after the first occurrence of a state q.
• Before: A given state p must occur before the first occurrence of a state q.
• Between: A given state p must occur between a pair of designated states.
• After and until: The state must occur after one state until the next occurrence
of another state.
The use of the temporal logic patterns assists in reducing the complexity of using tem-
poral logic formulas. We use the patterns in verifying properties in Spin in Chapter
3.
2.6 Timed Automata Theory
The second model checker used in this research, Uppaal, is based on the theory of
timed automata, hence the importance of introducing the theory in this section.
Timed automata theory [Alur and Dill, 1994, Bengtsson and Yi, 2004, Kourkouli
and Hassapis, 2005] is defined as a formal framework for modelling and analysing the
behaviour of real-time systems. Real-time systems are described as systems that must
fulfil time constraints, such as deadlines, response time, communication delays and
execution. In secure web applications, time constraints are crucial to deliver security
to both the user and the web application. Timed automata are finite-state directed
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graphs extended with real clock variables; time can elapse when it is in a state. When
a transition occurs, some of the clocks may be reset to zero, and the reading of a clock
is equal to the time that has elapsed since the last time the clock was reset.
Clock constraints, called guards, are used with each transition to restrict the be-
haviour of the automaton. A transition represented by an edge can be accepted when
the clock’s values satisfy the guard labelled on the edge. A clock constraint is also
associated with each location of automaton; this is called the invariant of the location.
Time can elapse in the location only as long as the invariant of the location is true.
Timed automata theory can assist in reachability analysis by determining a final state
or a set of final states; the analysis should determine if those states are reachable by
means of triggering transitions from the initial state.
The rest of this section discusses formal definitions of the syntax and semantics for
timed automata based on [Behrmann et al., 2004, Bengtsson and Yi, 2004].
2.6.1 Formal Syntax
Let X be a set of clock variables, then the set Φ (X) of clock constraints φ is defined
by the grammar φ ::= x ∼ c|φ1∧φ2, where x ∈ X, c ∈ N, and ∼∈ {<,6,=,>, >}. A
clock interpretation ν for a set X is a mapping from X to R+ where R+ denotes the
positive real numbers including zero. A clock interpretation ν for X satisfies a clock
constraint φ over X, denoted by ν |= φ, if and only if φ evaluates to true with the
values for the clocks given by ν. For δ ∈ R+, ν + δ denotes the clock interpretation
which maps every clock x to the value ν(x) + δ. For a set Y ⊆ X, ν [Y:= 0] denotes
the clock interpretation for X which assigns 0 to each x ∈ Y and agrees with ν over
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the rest of the clocks. We let Γ(X) denote the set of all the clock interpretations for X.
Definition 1 (Timed Automaton) A timed automaton then is a tuple (L, l0,Σ,
X, I, E ), where
• L is a finite set of locations.
• l0 ∈ L is the initial location.
• Σ is a finite set of labels.
• X is a finite set of clocks.
• I is a mapping that labels each location l ∈ L with some clock constraints in Φ
(X) (the location invariant).
• E ⊆ L × Σ × Φ (X) × 2x × L is a set of edges.
An edge (l,a,φ, λ, l
′
) represents a transition from location l to location l
′
on the sym-
bol a. The clock constraint φ specifies when the edge is enabled and the set λ ⊆ X
gives the clocks to be reset with this edge. The semantics of a timed automaton (L,
l0,Σ, X, I, E ) are defined by associating a transition system with it. A state is a pair
(l, ν), where l ∈ L, and ν ∈ Γ(X) such that ν |= L (l). The initial state is (l0, ν0),
where ν0(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X. There are two types of transitions (let δ ∈ R+ and let
a ∈ Σ ). First, ((l, ν) , (l, ν + δ)) is a δ-delay transition iff ν + δ′ |= I(l) for all 0
6 δ′ 6 δ. Second, ((l, ν) , (l′ , ν ′)) is an a-action transition iff an edge (l,a,φ, λ, l′)
exists such that ν |= φ, ν ′ = ν[λ := 0] and ν ′ |= I (l′).
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Figure 2.4: Attack Example
2.7 Modelling an Intruder (Man in the Middle)
In this section, we provide a description of the attack model used later in the modelling
of a compromised system in the Spin and Uppaal chapters.
An intruder can tamper with the contents of individual messages during their trans-
mission from the source to the destination. In the presence of such an intruder with
certain rights, the aim is to validate whether the security specifications under study
behave in a secure manner. Such tampering may go undetected; that is, the attacker
may disguise itself to impersonate the trusted source. The attacker may tamper with
the message to achieve denial-of-service (DoS) or replay attacks, in order to initiate its
own session with one of the parties. Figure 2.4 illustrates the concept in more detail.
In this figure, The user sends messages to the server. An attacker intercepts the mes-
sages, tampers with them and then forwards the modified messages to the server. This
kind of tampering may go undetected, resulting in attacks, such as denial-of-service
and replay attacks.
It is assumed that the attacker in this model has the abilities specified by [Dolev and
Yao, 1983]. These are the ability to:
• Overhear and intercept all the messages over the network.
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• Modify the messages.
• Generate new messages using information from overheard messages and some
prior information.
• Send a new or captured message to another entity in the system.
The intruder collects knowledge about both parties. The knowledge is used during a
session to create and send the intruder’s own messages or to tamper with other agent
communication.
SSL security protocol [Frier et al., 1996, Rescorla, 2001] is considered secure. However,
intruders now attack the communication process not the SSL protocol itself. The
process is used to attack the transition from an unsecured connection to a secure one,
in this case from HTTP to HTTPS, where the intruder is attacking the bridge and
can act as man-in-the-middle in an SSL connection before the communication occurs.
Tools such as the SSLstrip assist in breaking the communication [Elks, 2011, Gangan,
2015].
2.8 Conclusions
This chapter discussed the main concepts of our research. The chapter provided the
background for later chapters. The chapter can be summarized as follows:
• In Section 2.1, we discussed web application development challenges. The dy-
namic nature of web applications was identified as the main challenge. In Chap-
ter 3, we show how it is possible to model the dynamic navigation of web appli-
cations.
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• Section 2.2 identified navigation properties of web applications and discussed
related work. We distinguished our research from related work by verification
of both static and dynamic properties in a simple model.
• In Section 2.3, we discussed web application security properties. Session man-
agement, authentication and control flow vulnerabilities were analysed with a
focus on the main properties.
• Model Checking theory was presented in section 2.4, with a brief presentation
and comparison with other verification techniques.
• Section 2.5 is a primary section of our research. The temporal logic branches
LTL and CTL will be used to verify properties in the following chapters. We
discussed and compared both logics. We also listed the key logic patterns in
Section 2.5.3 that will assist in verifying complex properties.
• Section 2.6 presented the timed automata theory and its formal syntax.
• Since we use an intruder to show the differences in the sequence of actions and
timing in our models, Section 2.7 discussed how an intruder is modelled.
The next chapter presents the first model checking tool, Spin, and describes how it
is used to model and verify a web application.
Chapter 3
Modelling in SPIN
This chapter discusses the Spin model checker used to model a web application and
verifies the properties discussed in Chapter 2. Firstly, an overview of Spin and its
input language Promela is given. Secondly, as Spin does not support the modelling
time concept, the integration of time into Promela is discussed, along with examples
from existing literature. There is then a detailed modelling of the web application
example (online banking web application). Finally, the properties are verified and
there is a discussion of the verification options in Spin.
3.1 The SPIN Model Checker
Spin is an explicit state model checker, developed by Gerard J. Holzmann [Holzmann,
2004] for verifying communication protocols. The specification language used for Spin
is called Promela. Spin can be used in two methods, as a simulator and as a verifier.
In the former, Spin provides the advantage of creating a quick impression of the system
behaviour as it is being built. Spin uses a graphical user interface (ispin) in which a
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model can be visualised during the simulation runs, and therefore assists in debugging
the model from the first stages. Moreover, when the verifier is used, the simulator
displays the error trace if an error is found. To tackle and reduce the state explosion
problem; Spin provides advanced features:
• partial-order reduction in order to reduce the number of reachable states;
• bit-state hashing;
• state compression in order to reduce the amount of memory needed to store all
the states.
The Spin model checker has three main components:
Simulator In the first stages of modelling a system, the simulator has three options
to check the correctness of the model: random, interactive or guided simula-
tion. With a random simulation Spin chooses non-deterministically among all
executable statements which one to execute next. Whereas in an interactive
simulation, Spin gives the user the option to choose from all possible state-
ments. A guided simulation option is only activated when there is an invalid
verification, i.e. if a property is not satisfied, the guided simulation will show
the trail that leads to the counterexample.
LTL Translator An LTL formula is used to define a property ϕ, that should hold for
a given system model. The Spin verifier will, at this point, show the opposite,
meaning the negated LTL formula ¬ϕ is translated into a never claim to verify
the model. Propositional variables in an LTL formula can only be variables of
the Boolean type, which are defined as global variables or symbols in the model.
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Verifier Generator The verifier generates a C program for the model that is checked
by the program pan for counterexamples to a specified property ϕ
3.1.1 Promela
The Promela modelling language is a non-deterministic, multi-process language.
The namePromela is an acronym for Process Meta-Language. It is not meant to be
an implementation language, but rather a model description language. The emphasis
therefore is on modelling on process synchronisation and coordination, and not on
computation. This section is not meant to give a complete overview of Promela,
but rather a brief introduction to enable the following implementation models to be
understood. A further explanation of the language can be found in [Holzmann, 2004].
The basis building of Promela consists of asynchronous processes, buffered and
unbuffered message channels, synchronising statements and structured data.
In order to create a model in Spin, first a process is declared. Processes are the only
active components in Promela; messages and variable states are only changed or
inspected by a process. A process is declared using the keyword proctype.
1 proctype Client () {
2 /* code for Client */
3 }
This process type is named Client, and in the declaration body a list of local decla-
rations and/or statements are added. A process is either executed by the call run or
by adding the prefixed active statement before the proctype statement.
Processes communicate with each other through channels and global variables. There
are four basic variable types: bit or bool (1 bit), byte (8 bits), short (16 bits), and
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int (32 bits). Variables can be defined as global or local within each process. It is
recommended to use a data type with as few bits as possible to reduce the state space
during the verification phase. The variable type mtype, can be used to define the
symbolic names of numeric constants. A mtype is used in a web application model to
identify each message and to keep track of the sequence of communication. Table 3.1
shows the operators used in Promela. The symbols can be defined using (define).
The scope of a symbol is global, and an expression is a fixed number, a boolean
expression, or an expression that assigns a value to the symbol.
Channels in Promela are used for processes to communicate with each other. A
channel is defined using the keyword chan. There exist two types of channel in
Promela, asynchronous or synchronous (rendezvous): The asynchronous channels
are buffers that can store a finite number of elements. The synchronous channels
have a length of zero. A channel is blocked unless there is a message waiting and the
message matches the pattern of the receive statement. Likewise, writing to a channel
is blocked if the channel is full. In the case of a synchronous channel, reading from
it will always be blocked until the sender is ready to send, and the channel is always
full until the receiver is ready to receive. The capacity of the buffer and the type of
message can be given as parameters when the channel is declared. For example:
1 chan network = [0] of { mtype }
2 network!login /*send the message "login"*/
3 network?login /* receive the message login*/
4 network?x /* receive the message , and store in variable x*/
5 network?eval(x); /* receive the message , only if it contains x*/
6 network?_ /* receive the message , and do not store it*/
In this Promela code, a channel called network is initialised as a synchronous channel
with a length of zero. The message type is mtype. To send or to receive a message
the symbols ! and ? are used. If a process sends a message, the other process can
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receive this message and has the option to store its value to x of the same type mtype.
With network ? eval(login); the message is only received and removed from the
channel if the message’s content is equal to the value of the variable x. The predefined
write-only is used to receive a message if the value of the message is irrelevant.
Operators Associativity Comment
()[] . Left to right Parentheses, array brackets, field selection
! v ++ – Right to left Negation, complement, increment, decre-
ment
* / % Left to right Multiplication, division, modulo
+ - Left to right Addition, subtraction
<<>> Left to right Left and right shift
<<= >>= Left to right Relational operators
==, ! = Left to right Equal, unequal
& Left to right Bitwise and
∧ Left to right Bitwise exclusive or
| Left to right Bitwise or
&& Left to right Logical and
|| Left to right Logical or
− >: Right to left Conditional expression operators
= Right to left Assignment
Table 3.1: Operators in Promela.
In Promela, the control statements are selection, repetition and jump. Spin
executes the statements sequentially in the process body. If a statement blocks (eval-
uates to false), no other statement in the process can execute until the statement
evaluates to true, which may be the result of a variable assignment or a sent message.
In order to alter the process flow, Promela has two kinds of loop constructs: selection
and repetitive constructs. The constructs consist of one or more option sequences. A
sequence begins with a guard, and if the guard evaluates to true, the option sequence
is chosen for execution.
Selection Construct A selection construct starts with the keyword if and ends
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with the keyword fi. In between, several statements are defined. Each state-
ment starts with a double colon, followed by a statement called guard that either
evaluates to true or false, an arrow, and then a sequence of statements.
An example of a simple selection construct:
1 if
2 :: (statue != HomePage) -> option 1
3 :: (status == HomePage) -> option 2
4 fi
Here, at most one option from the list will be executed. If more than one guard
is true, the selection between them then becomes non-deterministic. A guard
can be any Promela statement or expression which blocks until at least one
guard is true. In the case that all the guard conditions in a loop construct eval-
uate to false, then there is no available option for execution and the execution
process blocks. A special guard else statement is used in selection or repetition
structures to define a condition that is true, if and only if, all other guard con-
ditions in the sequence structure evaluate to false. In contrast to the predefined
keyword timeout, else provides an escape clause at the process level, while
timeout does so at the system level.
Repetition Construct The repetition construct starts with the keyword do and
ends with od. It has the same syntax as the selection statements with guards and
is followed by different statements. After the sequence of statements executed
is finished, the loop is automatically repeated from the start, while the selection
construct moves on to the next statement. The repetition construct can be
broken by either transferring control explicitly with a goto statement or by
executing a break statement.
An example of a simple repetitive construct:
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1 do
2 :: (timer != 0) -> timer ++
3 :: (timer == 0) -> break
4 od
The body of the loop in this example will stop when the process reaches zero.
If (timer == 0) the loop is exited. In the case of (timer != 0) the process
increments the timer, and then continues around the timer. The keyword break
is used here to exit the loop and the process executes the statements following
the keyword od.
Jump statements In Promela it is possible to use the prefixed keyword goto with
a label to jump to another statement within the same process. Moreover, labels
are needed for the LTL formulae at the verification phase and there are three
special labels end, progress and accept which will be discussed later in the
verification section. Labels are marked with a single colon and put in front
of a selection or repetition construct. Here is an example as used in the web
application model to check the guard statement and then to move to another
label that represent a different ( Page ).
1 HomePage:
2 statement 1 ; statement 2 -> goto AccountPage
3 AccountPage:
In Spin an internal location counter points in every process to the statement that
executes next. As Spin cannot execute two statements at the same time, in every
step it chooses non-deterministically between one of the executable statements of all
processes. After executing the first statement, Spin chooses another possible state-
ment from the same process. In some cases it is important to group a sequence of
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statements into one logical group that is be executed as one indivisible unit, non-
interleaved by other processes. Promela provides two structures to avoid this: an
atomic block or d step block, which abstracts the statements into one state change.
Neither allow the interference of other processes until the statement sequence has fin-
ished. This is useful for reducing the size of the state space and avoiding unnecessary
and trivial state changes. The atomic allows non-determinism while the d step can
be executed significantly more efficiently by the verifier, but d step does not allow
non-deterministic selection.
3.1.2 Verification in Spin
Spin offers the following ways to express correctness properties:
Assertions A basic assertion expresses invariants and can occur anywhere in the
model in the form of: assert(expression). Assertions are the only constructs
that are checked during the simulation phase. As long as the expression provided
is evaluated to a true or a non-zero integer value, the assertion statement has no
effect on the simulation process. If the assertion is false, Spin reports an error
and exits.
Trace assertions are similar to basic assertions but apply to channels. They are
used to monitor the event sequences of messages exchanged between the pro-
cesses. These events do not generate a new behaviour but they are required to
match send or receive events on the same channels in the model.
Never Claim A never claim is used to express finite or infinite system behaviour that
should never occur. It can be generated automatically from an LTL formula. In
contrast to trace assertions, never claims match boolean propositions on system
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states, while trace assertions match event occurrences that can occur in the
transitions between system states.
Meta labels Promela uses special labels with the goto keyword, and it is evaluated
during the run of the verification phase. The possible label types are: end,
progress and accept. The first label type is the End-state labels that are used
in Spin for the verifier to be able to distinguish between valid and invalid end-
states. When a timeout occurs, end-states are evaluated. Statements can be
made valid end-states by adding the label end. In this case all other end-states
are considered to be invalid.
The Progress-state labels are used to specify a liveness property. These labels
are used to mark a state where effective progress is being made in an execution.
For example, when a sequence number is being incremented or when a valid
message is accepted by a receiver in a communication protocol. The last label
type is the Accept-state labels which are mostly used in never claims that are
generated from LTL formulae. States can be marked as accept to ensure that
when the model is verified, the state must be reached at least once.
Promela has no mechanism for expressing time related properties or clocks. The
timeout statement is the only approach in this direction; its value becomes true when
there are no executable statements in the system. There are attempts to model real
time in Promela, which are presented in the next section with examples from the
literature about integrating time constraints into Spin.
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3.1.3 Modelling Time in SPIN
The Promela language is designed to specify systems of asynchronous processes and
for proving functional correctness of a given model. It abstracts from the behaviour
of the processes’ scheduler and from any assumptions about the speed of execution. If
integrating time or clock variables to Spin, this could lead to an increase in execution
time and memory and may reach a state explosion problem. There are methods to
simulate time in Spin such as an abstraction of time using constraints that is true or
not, or by adding a process that controls time.
An example is the work of [Bosnacki, 1998], that creates a set of macros at the start
of the model which add discrete time. However, by adding an extra timer process, the
system can be difficult to follow and even predicting the outcome and the number of
states can increase rapidly. In addition, all actions that take time have to synchronize
on time and the passing of time acts like a scheduler for the model; this makes the
model hard to analyse. [Tripakis and Courcoubetis, 1996] extended Spin with timed
Bu¨chi automata, and created an extension called RT-Promela. The drawback is
that it uses an old version of Spin (version 2.9) while the current version is 6.1.
The work of [Brinksma et al., 2002, Ruys, 2003] used the Variable time advance
method. By creating a variable that simulates time and changes forward to the next
moment in time when some event triggers a state transition, all intervening time is
skipped.
In order to model realistic web application properties that include time, a model will
need to include time constraints to represent time-out situations and to keep track of
the sequence of time and actions between different models.
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3.2 Modelling Web Applications in Spin
The rest of this chapter will show how we develop a model of a simple transaction
between a client and a server. For this purpose we use the model design approach
developed by [Holzmann, 2004]. In order to achieve a correct model and to reduce
the level of complexity, we start with the basic structure that captures the essential
characteristics of the model. We then evolve the model gradually to cover more
properties. As a result, we can analyse the behaviour of the model after each addition.
In the case that the complexity grows rapidly, we use the verification tool to check
that the model is built accurately and the results are correct. Failing to follow such
an approach could lead to a complex model and a time consuming process with no
clear results.
For modelling a web application in Spin we start modelling gradually and then add
a function with each step. The structure of developing our model is as follows:
• The first model in section 3.2.1 will only contain one session of the client logging
into his/her online banking account to make a simple transaction, as shown in
Figure 3.1 and the model terminates at the end of the run. We examine the
basic properties of authentication, navigation and session management at this
stage of the model.
• In the second model in section 3.2.2 we model a dynamic page navigation where
different input lead to different pages. We keep the model simple and verify
further properties since now the client can logout and re-login, the sequence of
actions will be different.
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Figure 3.1: Model of Online Banking.
• In the third model we introduce a novel approach for modelling discrete time
in Spin. We add an extra process that controls the session, and we then verify
properties that rely on timing, such as session management properties.
• The final model in section 3.2.4 includes an intruder that becomes active in the
middle of the communication. We examine the difference in the sequence of
actions and timing between a secure model and a compromised model.
Each model will include a description of the processes involved, and we show the
outcome of the simulation phase of the first execution. We then show how to verify
the properties in Spin, and we will include the result for each property. The results
from Spin show the following:
• Property verification result, if the output result shows zero then there is no
error found, but if the output shows one then the property does not hold for the
model under verification.
• Depth reached.
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• Number of States (stored and matched).
• Number of transitions.
• Total actual memory usage.
• Elapsed verification time.
In the verification phase in each model we use different approaches to verification
as discussed in section 3.1.2 depending on the properties. Some properties can be
checked by assertions in the code, while in other properties it is more effective to use
LTL formulas.
3.2.1 Model without Timer
The first experiment of modelling a web application is without the addition of time
constraints. This will assist in understanding the difference between both models
(with timed constraints and without the notion of time) in terms of timing, modelling
complexity, and verification results. In the first stage in explaining the process of the
first model we explain the symbolic names (mtype) used to define the names of the
range of messages used in the interprocess message exchange and all the variables that
keep track of the client’s location and status. Then, the specification of the client-side
in Promela will be discussed. Finally, the possible properties’ verification will be
discussed.
In this example a model is created in Promela containing a client communicating
with a server to enter his account and proceeding with a simple transaction (e.g.
making a payment). At each stage of the communication a record of the client’s
location and status (i.e. logged-in or logged-out) will be saved to two global variables
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(Status and Page) in order to be used for the verification when the properties are
specified using LTL and for the flow control of the model.
1 mtype page = err;
2 mtype Status = err;
3 mtype partnerA = err;
4 mtype partnerB = err;
5 mtype statusA = err;
6 mtype statusB = err;
Listing 3.1: Global variables of first model
The global variables shown in listing 3.1 are first used to track the message exchange
and the status of both the client and server in the model, and also to assist in the
authentication phase. Six variables are defined to keep track of the communication
and to check the LTL properties in a later phase:
The first two global variables Status and page are used to keep track of the location
of the client and the status of the communication (logged-in, logged-out and timed-
out). partnerA is set to true when the client sends a request to login with the server.
PartnerB is set to true when the client is known to the server. StatusA is set to
true when the authentication is acknowledged by the server. StatusB is similar as
the client is now authenticated to the server. We assign each of the variables to the
symbolic name err to avoid being left uninitialised, the value of the variable is zero,
and in this case it is outside the value range of possible mtype values.
Next we declare the symbolic names mtype as in listing 3.2; which is used to define
the names of the range of messages used in an interprocess message exchange. The
first set represent messages that the client sends in order to navigate within the web
application. While the second set is used by the status variables Status and Page, and
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is also used by the client process when creating new messages. Spin parser assigns a
unique positive integer value to each name which represents it internally. The Status
and Page variables can take any value from the mtype declaration. To represent a
simple abstract of an encrypted message, the typedef in line 5 is used to declare an
abstract of an encrypted message Crypt that contains two entries: a session id and
the content that represents the request and the response between the client and the
server in the model. It will be used at the server side in order to check the content
and to process an action.
1 mtype = {ok , err , ack , msg1 , msg2 , msg3 , msg4 , msg5 ,
2 Logout , sessionId , user , server };
3 mtype = {home , account , payment , confirm , logout , error , login
};
5 typedef Crypt { mtype session , content1}
Listing 3.2: Symbolic names of first model
The network in listing 3.3 is modelled as a global single message channel that is shared
by all on the network. In order to keep the model simple and to reduce the size of
the model, synchronous communication is used which is shown by a buffer length of
0. We define a message on the network as triple that consists of a message number,
the intended receiver, and the encrypted message Crypt which contains the values of
the session id and the type of request.
1 chan network = [0] of {mtype , mtype , Crypt};
Listing 3.3: Channel of first model
The first process in the model is the client process that initiates the communication
with the server process as shown in listing 3.4. At the start, the client process is
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declared with the prefix active defining that it starts automatically during the ex-
ecution. At first the client assemble a message (msg1) that contains the session id
and the client id to the server. This exchange represents the request to login to his
account. If the server process replies with a (ack) it will then be checked using the
condition as shown in line 13, that it is from the server and that the session id is the
same. Then it will set the global variable statusB to ok. The authentication process
is a simple abstract that only serves the model requirements.
1 active proctype Client ()
3 Crypt messageUS; /* encrypted message to Server */
4 Crypt data; /* received encrypted message */
5 A:
6 partnerA = server;
8 /* login message */
9 messageUS.session = sessionId;
10 messageUS.content1 = user;
11 network! msg1 (partnerA , messageUS);
12 network? ack (partnerA , data);
13 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1 == server)
14 statusB = ok;
Listing 3.4: Client process of first model
In each message as in 3.5, the client sends his session id and the request for each page
by changing the messageUS.content1 to a page name as declared in the symbolic
names set mtype, and then waits for a response from the server side. Since there is
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no timer, at this stage it is only a normal session with no time-out. At the end of the
session the client requests to logout and then the session terminates.
1 /* Second message */
2 messageUS.session = sessionId;
3 messageUS.content1 = account;
4 network! msg2 (partnerA , messageUS);
5 network? ack (partnerA , data);
Listing 3.5: Second message at the client process
Secondly, the server process receives the client messages and control the session. At
this side of the communication, the server keeps track of the status of the client and
the location at each page using the global variables we declared at the beginning.
Firstly, the first action at the Server process 3.6 shown in listing is labelled with
a position label (HomePage) that represents the pages of the web application model.
When it receives the first message and its contents (session id, user id) it then starts
a selection statement ( if - fi ). The first statement after a double colon has a
guard statement: (data.session == sessionId)&& (data.content1 == user). If
at this stage the client id or the session id is not correct then it will execute the
goto HomePage jump statement and redirect the user again from the start. If it is
successful, the variable statusA representing the authentication stage is set to ok,
and the global variable Status is set to login. The global variable page is changed
on each page to the current location, and first it is set to home. At the end of the
statement the goto AccountPage jump statement is used to move to the next page.
1 active proctype Server ()
2 mtype sessionId;
3 Crypt messageSU; /* encrypted message to the user */
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4 Crypt data; /* received encrypted message */
5 partnerB = user;
6 messageSU.session = sessionId;
7 messageSU.content1 = server;
8 HomePage: page = home;
9 network? msg1 (partnerB , data);
10 if
11 ::( data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1 == user) ->
12 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU);
13 statusA = ok;
14 Status = login;
15 goto AccountPage;
16 ::else -> goto HomePage;
17 fi;
18
Listing 3.6: Server process of first model
When the server receives the second message as in listing 3.7, it will start another
selection statement ( if - fi ) that is similar to the first statement to check the
session id, and the content of the message. At this stage the client requests to move
to the account page. An assertion assert ( page == home && Status == login )
is made after receiving the second message that the page sequence is correct and the
client is logged in.
1 AccountPage:
2 network? msg2 (partnerB , data);
3 assert ( page == home && Status == login )
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5 if ::( data.session == sessionId)&&( data.content1 == account) ->
6 page = account;
7 network ! ack (partnerB ,messageSU);
8 goto PaymentPage;
10 ::else -> goto HomePage;
11 fi;
Listing 3.7: Second message of the server process
3.2.1.1 Simulation and Verification Results of Model without Timer
In order to understand the behaviour of the model and the properties the model
captures, simulations are performed at the first stage. The simulation phase allows
the detection of any early mistakes in the model design and any deviation from the
expected behaviour of the model. First the model is checked for safety properties
such as deadlocks or assertion violations. The following command produces a result
that verifies that the model is deadlock free and there are no assertion violations.
Figure 3.2 shows the result of the check. The verification run confirms that there are
no problems and that the model is still simple with only 53 states. There were no
unreachable states, meaning that the flow of our model is correct. The elapsed time
shows zero, as the model is still simple and does not take time to verify.
$ spin -run -DSAFTY Session1.pml
The sequence chart in Figure 3.3 assists in the simulation stage to understand how
the parties in the communication exchange messages. We can see that the messages
start from msg1 to msg5 by changing the content of the message to the page name.
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State-vector 40 byte, depth reached 51, errors: 0
53 states, stored
4 states, matched
57 transitions (= stored+matched)
128.730 total actual memory usage
unreached in proctype Server
(0 of 51 states)
unreached in proctype User
(0 of 25 states)
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.2: Safety Verification of Model without Timer
The result proves the correct sequence as we intended for the first model. Later when
we add more to the model, the sequence chart will show how it is different.
Figure 3.3: Message Sequence Chart of Model without Timer.
In listing 3.8 we verify the sequence of messages and the correctness of the model
behaviour, by using the trace assertion to specify the order of messages exchanged
between processes. We need to include all the network activity from sending and
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receiving. In the case the order is incorrect, the verifier will show an assertion violation
at the run result.
1 trace
2 {do
3 :: network!msg1;network?msg1;
4 :: network!ack;network?ack;
5 :: network!msg2;network?msg2;
6 :: network!msg3;network?msg3;
7 :: network!msg4;network?msg4;
8 :: network!msg5;network?msg5;
9 od;}
Listing 3.8: Trace assertion for first model
Figure 3.4: Page Sequence and LTL Proposition Letters.
For the next step, we use LTL to verify authentication, navigation and session man-
agement properties. We created Figure 3.4 to represent the sequence of the pages
in the first model. This shows a finite number of pages that represent the correct
navigation path. Each page is labelled with a propositional symbol. Each LTL for-
mula will contain a condition based on a global variable, or a remote reference a label
in the model that represent pages, for example Server@HomePage returns nonzero if
and only if the location counter of the server process is at the point labelled by the
HomePage. In listing 3.9 we define all the pages and give them a propositional symbol
as shown in Figure 3.4.
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1 #define p (Server@HomePage)
2 #define q (Server@AccountPage)
3 #define r (Server@PaymentPage)
4 #define s (Server@ConfirmtPage)
5 #define z (Server@Logoutpage)
Listing 3.9: Pages references at first model
The first LTL formula (3.1) is to verify an abstract authentication, and each of the
parties in the communication need to ensure that they are communicating with the
intended agent. Figure 3.5 shows the result that the formula is correct in the model.
Since the authentication is at the start of the model, Spin finds a result fast and the
number of states stored is lower than in the first run. The transitions increased in the
verification when Spin generates a never claim automaton to verify the property.
<> ( partnerA == server&& partnerB == user)− >
<> ( statusA == ok&& statusB == ok )
(3.1)
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 26, errors: 0
33 states, stored (49 visited)
16 states, matched
65 transitions (= visited+matched)
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.5: Verification Result of Property 3.1
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The next LTL formula 3.2 is another way to verify a successful authentication for the
model. Figure 3.6 shows the result from the verification, and since the condition is at
the start of the execution, the number of states is smaller than the formula (3.1).
<> ( statusA == ok&& statusB == ok ) (3.2)
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 26, errors: 0
17 states, stored (34 visited)
13 states, matched
47 transitions (= visited+matched)
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.6: Verification Result of Property 3.2
In LTL formula 3.3 we verify that the client is in a logged in status at the account
page and cannot bypass the authentication process at the start. Also, the same LTL
formula could be applied to all other pages. Figure 3.7 shows the result. Since the
formula is more complex we notice that the depth reached 99 from the initial system
state, and the number of transitions increased.
[ ] ( ( page == account )− ><> ( statusA == ok&& statusB == ok ) ) (3.3)
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State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 99, errors: 0
59 states, stored
6 states, matched
65 transitions (= stored+matched)
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.7: Verification Result of Property 3.3
In LTL formula 3.4 the position state label is used to ensure that the client is
at status login when he is at the payment page. The symbol letter r refers to
Server@PaymentPage as explained in listing 3.9. Figure 3.8 shows the results of the
verification with an increase in the number of states, transitions and depth reached,
due to the location of the page under verification.
[ ] ( r )− ><> Status == login (3.4)
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 112, errors: 0
68 states, stored
9 states, matched
77 transitions (= stored+matched)
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.8: Verification Result of Property 3.4
The next step is to verify navigation properties, and Spin can check the sequence
and order of pages in the model by using LTL patterns as discussed early in the
background chapter, section 2.5.3. We use the response and precedence patterns to
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verify the order of states (i.e.pages and session status). The first property we check is
that the home page is always followed by an account page. We use the global response
pattern in formula 3.5 where p is defined as the home page and q as the account page.
Running a verification of this formula shows no errors and the number of transitions
has increased compared to the previous results as shown in Figure 3.9.
The reason for the increase is that Spin generates a more complex never claim au-
tomaton for the LTL formula 3.5. To understand how the never claim works, we can
generate it using the command (spin -f ’[](p -> <>q)’). The result in Figure
3.10 shows the never claim that is included during the verification run of the LTL for-
mula. The guard condition (1) in all the repetition loops is equivalent to the boolean
value true, and (‖) is a symbol of the logical operator (or). We do not generate a
never claim for each verification as in the latest version of Spin it is possible just
to write the LTL formula at the end of the Promela code using the command ltl
name formula. Spin does not search for system executions that satisfy the property
but in executions that violate it, meaning in property 3.5 we verify that p becomes
true first and then q.
([](p− ><> q)) (3.5)
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State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 93, errors: 0
71 states, stored (89 visited)
25 states, matched
114 transitions (= visited+matched)
0 atomic steps
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.9: Verification Result of Property 3.5
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never { /* [](p -> <>q) */
T0_init:
do
:: (((! ((p))) || ((q)))) -> goto accept_S20
:: (1) -> goto T0_S27
od;
accept_S20:
do
:: (((! ((p))) || ((q)))) -> goto T0_init
:: (1) -> goto T0_S27
od;
accept_S27:
do
:: ((q)) -> goto T0_init
:: (1) -> goto T0_S27
od;
T0_S27:
do
:: ((q)) -> goto accept_S20
:: (1) -> goto T0_S27
:: ((q)) -> goto accept_S27
od;
}
Figure 3.10: Never Claim for Property 3.5
We can also use a specific precedence LTL formula pattern in 3.6 which means that
the account page q cannot become true until the home page p is true. Both LTL
formulas 3.5 and 3.6 could be applied to all other pages in the model by changing the
proposition symbol letter. Though both formulas specify the same meaning of the
Chapter 3. Modelling in Spin 73
order of pages. We compare the differences in the number of states between a simple
formula and a complex formula.
(! q U p ) (3.6)
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 8, errors: 0
7 states, stored (14 visited)
4 states, matched
18 transitions (= visited+matched)
0 atomic steps
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.11: Verification Result of Property 3.6
Figure 3.6 shows that the number of states and depth reached is smaller than the
result in 3.5, though the formula serves the same purpose as pages order. The reason
for this is that it finds that the home page p is true at the start of the execution and
then it is followed by the account page. The number of transitions is also lower (18
transitions) since the never claim generated by Spin has less checking loops, as shown
in Figure 3.12.
In order to check that the LTL formula we used is correct, we can do the opposite
and change the order of pages such as the account page comes before the home page
in the LTL formula !p U q. When we run the verification, an error is reported in
Figure 3.13 with an increase in the number of states, translations and depth reach.
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never { /* !q U p */
T0_init:
do
:: atomic { ((p)) -> assert(!((p))) }
:: (! ((q))) -> goto T0_init
od;
accept_all:
skip
}
Figure 3.12: Never Claim for Property 3.6
When an error is reported Spin produces a error-trail file. We use the trace file
to locate the state where the property is violated, using the command (spin -t
-p file.pml). The option (-t) refers to the trace file while (-p) prints all the
statements from the start of the verification.
Since we kept the model small, this made it easy to verify and follow the sequence
of actions. We know that the account page comes after the home page and we asked
to prove that the home page becomes true after the account page. In Figure 3.14
Spin shows that an assertion is violated after both parties in the model prepare the
messages to send and the verifier finds that the server is at the home page.
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State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 30, errors: 1
19 states, stored (33 visited)
13 states, matched
46 transitions (= visited+matched)
0 atomic steps
hash conflicts: 0 (resolved)
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.13: Verification Error Result of Property 3.13
spin -t -p Session1.pml
ltl m1: (! ((Server@HomePage))) U ((Server@AccountPage))
starting claim 2
using statement merging
Never claim moves to line 4 [(!((Server._p==AccountPage)))]
2:proc 1 (User:1) Session1.pml:115 (state 1)[partnerA = server]
4:proc 1 (User:1) Session1.pml:120 (state 2)[messageUS.session = sessionId]
4:proc 1 (User:1) Session1.pml:121 (state 3)[messageUS.content1 = user]
6:proc 0 (Server:1) Session1.pml:37 (state 1)[partnerB = user]
8:proc 0 (Server:1) Session1.pml:40 (state 2)[messageSU.session = sessionId]
8:proc 0 (Server:1) Session1.pml:41 (state 3)[messageSU.content1 = server]
spin: _spin_nvr.tmp:5, Error: assertion violated
spin: text of failed assertion:
assert(!((!(!((Server._p==HomePage)))&&!((Server._p==AccountPage)))))
Never claim moves to line 5
[assert(!((!(!((Server._p==HomePage)))&&!((Server._p==AccountPage)))))]
spin: trail ends after 9 steps
Figure 3.14: Error-trail File of Property 3.13
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Until this stage, we checked simple LTL formulas. We need to check that a certain
action becomes true after a step and until another action occurs. For example, after
the login the status global variable is set to ’login’ and remains true until the logout
page. In this scenario we can use a more complex LTL formula shown in the LTL
formula 3.7, the symbol p is defined as Server@HomePage, while the z symbol is defined
as Server@LogoutPage and the symbol m is a new definition with the condition #
define Status ==login. We verify that the condition is true after the login page
until the logout page. The results in Figure 3.15 shows no errors and the behaviour
of the model is correct. The number of transitions is still small at this stage of the
model.
[ ] ( p&& ! z− > ( ! z U (m&& ! z ) ) ) (3.7)
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 93, errors: 0
71 states, stored (89 visited)
25 states, matched
114 transitions (= visited+matched)
0 atomic steps
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.15: Verification Result of Property 3.7
Again for the same LTL formula 3.7 we can modify the condition to # define Status
==logout, meaning that during the session the status of the client was inactive. The
results in Figure 3.16 shows an error is located and now the elapsed time has increased
Chapter 3. Modelling in Spin 77
to (0.03) considering the size of the model. This is due to the complexity of proving
this property.
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 74, errors: 1
34 states, stored
0 states, matched
34 transitions (= stored+matched)
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0.03 seconds
Figure 3.16: Verification Error Result of Property 3.7
We also use the same value of the global variable # define Status ==logout and
check that after the logout page the session expires, as shown if LTL response formula
3.8, the z symbol is defined as Server@LogoutPage. The result shows no errors were
found, as in 3.17
[ ] ( z− > <> m ) (3.8)
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 93, errors: 0
56 states, stored (59 visited)
8 states, matched
67 transitions (= visited+matched)
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 second
Figure 3.17: Verification Result of Property 3.8
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It is also possible to check the status of the session on each page such as in 3.9. Where
q is the account page and m is defined as # define Status ==login. Furthermore,
changing the page locations using the current formula with different conditions makes
it possible to understand the behaviour of the model. The results in Figure 3.18 show
no errors were found, and since the account page is at the start it was possible with
a small number of states and transitions.
<> (q&&m) (3.9)
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 30, errors: 0
24 states, stored (48 visited)
27 states, matched
75 transitions
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 second
Figure 3.18: Verification Result of Property 3.9
LTL formula Depth reached States Stored Transitions Total Memory (Mb) Time (sec)
3.1 26 33 65 128.730 0
3.2 26 17 47 128.730 0
3.3 99 59 65 128.730 0
3.4 112 68 77 128.730 0
3.5 93 71 114 128.730 0
3.6 8 7 18 128.730 0
3.7 93 71 114 128.730 0
3.8 93 56 67 128.730 0
3.9 30 24 75 128.730 0
Table 3.2: Verification Results of Properties for Model without Time.
In Table 3.2 we list all the verification results for the first model. We notice that by
keeping the model simple we managed to verify main the properties efficiently without
increasing the complexity level. The depth reached and the number of states relies on
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the property under examination and it increases with the increase in the complexity
of the LTL formula. More web applications’ properties can be verified using the LTL
patterns. The next section presents the model with dynamic navigation properties.
3.2.2 Modelling Dynamic Navigation
In the this model of the web application we consider the dynamic behaviour of the
transitions. We do not assume the generation of new content but the modification of
the navigation path based on the client input and server status as discussed in the
background, Section 2.2. The main challenge in modelling with Spin is to understand
the execution behaviour of the Promela code.
In order to model a correct behaviour that represents the client and server exchanging
messages and changing transitions simultaneously we developed a new approach. The
new approach takes into account the execution behaviour of Spin and the dynamic
transitions during the session. For example, in the current Promela model if the
server process is at the certain location and the client requests to be redirected to a
previous page; Spin will reach a deadlock situation since the server process will be
expecting a different message than the client process sent.
The method to solve the problem is to add all the navigation possibilities of the model
under each page (i.e. location label in Promela). In detail, if the client is on the
account page, there will be two options in our model, to logout of the session or to
move to the next page which is the payment page in this model. The next example
will explain further. In the current model the run is infinite (in order to analyse
dynamic navigation properties where a single input could lead to different pages) in
contrast to the first model in 3.2.1 where both processes terminate at the end of the
session.
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At the server side in listing 3.10, we have two options in the if-fi selection loop, if
the message contains the request payment then the client will be directed to the next
page (line 4). If the content of the request contains logout (line 9), the server will
redirect the client to the home page. The nature of the execution is non-determinism
in Spin.
1 AccountPage:
2 if
3 :: network? msg2 (partnerB , data)-> /*
Move to Payment Page*/
4 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1 ==
payment) ->
5 page = account
6 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
7 goto PaymentPage
8 :: network ? msg5 (partnerB , data) -> /*
Client request logout */
9 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1 == logout) ->
10 page = home;network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
11 statusA = err
12 Status = logout
13 goto HomePage
14 fi
Listing 3.10: Server Dynamic Naviagtion
In the client side in listing 3.11, we use the repetition (do - od) loop on each page
to represent a continuous change of request. The client sends the session id and page
request, and Spin redirects the client process to a different page. We used a different
labelling system at the client side to represent the pages. For example in line 1 C
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represents the payment page. This means at the current stage the client is on the
payment page. Inside the (do - od) loop there are three options. First the client
may request to confirm the payment or go back to the account page or logout of the
session. In any scenario, the server process will also have all the options under each
page, resulting in a deadlock free model.
1 C: /* Payment Page */
2 do
3 :: messageUS.session = sessionId; messageUS.content1 =
confirm;
4 network! msg3 (partnerA , messageUS);
5 network? ack (partnerA , data)->goto D; /* D =
Confirmation Page */
7 :: messageUS.session = sessionId; messageUS.content1 =
account;
8 network! msg2 (partnerA , messageUS);
9 network? ack (partnerA , data)->goto B; /* B =
Account Page */
11 :: messageUS.session = sessionId; messageUS.content1 =
logout;
12 network! msg5 (partnerA , messageUS);
13 network? ack (partnerA , data)->statusB = err;goto A;
/* A = Home Page */
14 od;
Listing 3.11: Client Dynamic Navigation
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3.2.2.1 Simulation and Verification Results of the Dynamic Navigation
Model
In order to understand the behaviour of the model at the current stage we run the
following tests. First we check that the model is deadlock free and there are no
assertion violations. Spin shows in Figure 3.19 the result of the verification. Also,
it shows that both processes never reach an end state, meaning that the model had
infinite executions of a client logging in and logging out of any page. As a result, more
properties can be verified than in the first model in 3.2.1. The results show that the
model is still small with only 92 states and 110 transitions.
State-vector 40 byte, depth reached 52, errors: 0
92 states, stored
18 states, matched
110 transitions (= stored+matched)
128.730 total actual memory usage
unreached in proctype Server
DynamicModel.pml:124, state 66, "-end-"
(1 of 66 states)
unreached in proctype User
DynamicModel.pml:181, state 59, "-end-"
(1 of 59 states)
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.19: Safety Verification Result of Dynamic Navigation Model
The sequence of transitions is different, and the client can logout of any page in the
current model stage of the web application. We use the following command line (spin
-r -s -u50 DynamicModel.pml) with the run options (-s) to show the send events
on the channel, (-r) to show the receive events on the channel and (-u50) to execute
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the first 50 steps of the model. Figure 3.20 shows the simulation run and it shows
that the client starts with logging in msg1 and then logs out (line 16), then the second
time the user processes login and proceeds to other pages. Each line of the simulation
contains the step number, process number, file name, and channel action and content.
6: proc 1 (User:1) DynamicModel.pml:134 Sent msg1,server,0,user
6: proc 0 (Server:1) DynamicModel.pml:44 Recv msg1,server,0,user
8: proc 0 (Server:1) DynamicModel.pml:46 Sent ack,server,0,server
8: proc 1 (User:1) DynamicModel.pml:135 Recv ack,server,0,server
17: proc 1 (User:1) DynamicModel.pml:145 Sent msg5,server,0,logout
17: proc 0 (Server:1) DynamicModel.pml:61 Recv msg5,server,0,logout
20: proc 0 (Server:1) DynamicModel.pml:64 Sent ack,server,0,server
20: proc 1 (User:1) DynamicModel.pml:146 Recv ack,server,0,server
29: proc 1 (User:1) DynamicModel.pml:134 Sent msg1,server,0,user
29: proc 0 (Server:1) DynamicModel.pml:44 Recv msg1,server,0,user
31: proc 0 (Server:1) DynamicModel.pml:46 Sent ack,server,0,server
31: proc 1 (User:1) DynamicModel.pml:135 Recv ack,server,0,server
40: proc 1 (User:1) DynamicModel.pml:142 Sent msg2,server,0,account
40: proc 0 (Server:1) DynamicModel.pml:55 Recv msg2,server,0,account
Figure 3.20: Message Exchange Sample of Dynamic Navigation Model
The assumptions now include that the client can logout and login again. As a result,
we need to check that on any page after a successful authentication that session is
active. We can use the LTL formula 3.10 to verify that client cannot be on the
account page when the status of the session is logout. The q symbol is defined as
(Server@AccountPage), while m is defined as the condition (session == logout).
The result of the verification shows an error is found and that proves that when the
client is at the account page the session is set to login.
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<> ((q)&&(m)) (3.10)
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 26, errors: 1
19 states, stored (37 visited)
18 states, matched
55 transitions (= visited+matched)
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.21: Verification Result of Property 3.10
Another method of verifying session management properties is by assertions, as at
each page in the server process Spin can check the assertions on global variables. For
example we use (assert (Status ==login)) before each page followed by the login
page to ensure that the client is always logged in at this stage before making any
further transitions. Figure 3.22 shows that there are no assertion violations.
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 93, errors: 0
56 states, stored (59 visited)
8 states, matched
67 transitions (= visited+matched)
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 second
Figure 3.22: Verification Result of Global Variable Assertions
In order to verify the navigation path in the current stage, we can use either the LTL
response or precedence patterns (2.5.3). For example, it is always the case that the ac-
count page comes before the payment page and for that we use the precedence formula
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3.11. However, since we now have different possibilities of next pages from each page
we use the response LTL formula 3.12 and we include all the pages that come after
an initial state. For example, from the account page there are three options (payment
page, logout page, or home page). In 3.12 the symbol q represents the account page
and is defined as Server@AccountPage, r is defined as Server@PaymentPage, z is
defined as Server@LogoutPage and, p is defined as Server@HomePage. So from the
account page there will be three options, and we use the logical operator (or) repre-
sented by the symbol ‖ between pages. The result of this property shows no error, as
in Figure 3.23, and there is an increase in the number of states and transitions.
!rUq (3.11)
[](q− ><> r|| <> z|| <> p) (3.12)
State-vector 48 byte, depth reached 135, errors: 0
141 states, stored (169 visited)
69 states, matched
238 transitions (= visited+matched)
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.23: Verification Result of Property 3.12
3.2.3 Modelling with Time Constraints
Modelling using discrete time allows us to represent more session and authentication
properties and to simulate time-out scenarios in a web application. In order to model
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time in Spin, we add a discrete time process that controls the session.
The clock process contains a loop that controls the timer variable. The timer expires
when its value reaches some value controlled by the pre-defined variable MAX. The clock
process contains two statements; the first statement checks the condition of the timer
is less than the value MAX and then increments it. The statement starts with atomic
to preserve the exclusive privilege to execute before other processes in the model,
and this it ends this with skip so another process can execute its statements. This
method prevents the timer from controlling the session and from reaching a ”infinite
loop” status. The second statement contains a condition that checks if the timer is
equal to to the value MAX and then it assign it to zero and skip. The server controls
the timer and resets the value after each receiving of a message during a valid session.
We model the timer to verify the security properties, So if the value reaches MAX the
server will terminate the session and redirect the client to the home page.
1 MAX = n
2 proctype Clock ()
4 do
5 :: atomic {timer < MAX -> timer ++} skip;
6 ::else -> atomic {timer == MAX -> timer = 0} skip;
7 od;
Listing 3.12: Clock Process
At the server side, it is the same as in the previous models. We added a global
variable (Session) to use it with the timer in the verification phase. Also, as in
the Clock process, each atomic block ends with a skip, in order for other processes to
execute the next statement. The first assertion (assert (timer <= MAX && Session
== valid && Status == login)) checks that at this stage of the session the timer
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is less than the timeout value, the session is valid and the status is login. When the
server receives the second message it will start another selection statement ( if -
fi ) that is similar to the first statement that checks the session id, and only the
content of the message. In this case the client requests to move to the Account page.
An assertion is made after receiving the second message that the page sequence is
correct and the client is logged in. If there is a time-out the server will send an error
message. Figure 3.24 shows that after (msg3) there was a time-out and the server
sends an error message.
2 HomePage:
3 page = home /* LOGIN */
4 messageSU.session = sessionId
5 messageSU.content1 = server
6 if
7 :: network ? msg1 (partnerB , data)-> atomic {
8 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1 == user)
->
9 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
10 statusA = ok
11 Session = valid
12 Status = login }
13 skip;
14 fi
15 AccountPage: assert (timer <= MAX && Session == valid && Status
== login)
16 if
17 :: network? msg2 (partnerB , data)-> if
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18 /* Move to Payment Page*/
19 :: atomic {(data.session == sessionId) &&
20 (data.content1 == account)&&( timer < MAX) ->
21 page = account ;timer = 0
22 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
23 goto PaymentPage ;} skip;
25 ::else ->
26 atomic {Session = invalid;
27 network!error(partnerB , messageSU);
28 Status = logout;flag ++; MSG;goto HomePage ;}
29 skip; fi;
30 fi
Listing 3.13: Server Process with Timer
Figure 3.24: Simulation Chart of the Discrete Time Model.
We also add a global variable (flag) to each page and whenever the server reaches
a time-out and redirects the client to the home page (flag) is incremented. We also
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add (flag2, flag3, and flag4) at each page construct to assit in understanding and
debugging our code. This method ensures that the timer is active in all the sessions
and in different executions. The global macro MSG is defined as printf("Status is
%e n", Status) to print the status of the user after each logout from the session.
The value of MAX has an effect on the behaviour and number of states in the model so
we set it to the value 2 to keep the number of states reachable. The run of the model
is infinite in order to achieve a realistic scenario of a client being logged off after a
period of inactivity. Figure 3.25 shows the result of the simulation after 1,000 steps.
Through the execution of the model there was a time-out on each page.
depth-limit (-u10000 steps) reached
#processes: 4
partnerA = server
partnerB = user
statusA = ok
statusB = ok
page = confirm
Status = login
Session = valid
timer = 0
MAX = 2
flag = 12
flag2 = 4
flag3 = 5
flag4 = 2
Figure 3.25: Simulation Results of the Discrete Time Model
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3.2.3.1 Simulation and Verification Results of Timed Model
We now use the global variable MAX in the LTL formulas, for example we verify that
the client cannot be logged in and the timer is more than MAX. We use the ’Absence’
pattern of LTL formula 3.13 where q is the account page and m is defined as (timer >
MAX). The result shows no error as shown in Figure 3.26. It is clear that the number
of states has increased compared to in the previous models.
[](q− > [](!m)) (3.13)
State-vector 64 byte, depth reached 250, errors: 0
1182 states, stored
736 states, matched
1918 transitions (= stored+matched)
128.730 total actual memory usage
pan: elapsed time 0 seconds
Figure 3.26: Verification Result of Property 3.13
3.2.4 Adding an Intruder to the Model
At this stage we add an intruder process in our model. The model process is based on
the intruder model designed by Dolev and Yao [1983]. The intruder collects knowledge
about both parties during the session. The knowledge is used during a session to
create and send his own messages or to tamper with other agent communication.
The assumption is that the intruder has the session identity and the client identity.
The intruder first overhears and intercepts all the messages over the network, then
chooses a recipient and then generates new messages using information from overheard
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messages and some prior information, and finally sends a new or captured message to
another entity in the system.
The purpose of introducing an intruder to the model is to examine the differences
between the sequence of actions and timing. Though we assume that an online bank-
ing system is using the HTTPS communication protocol, the intruder can still be in
the middle of the communication parties. The assumption for this model is that the
intruder has already started to collect information about the parties in the communi-
cation and then he becomes active in the middle. We do not include any discussions
about cryptography in the model as it is beyond the scope of this research. The main
aim is to analyse the order of events in the communication and timing.
We use the same timer process from the previous model 3.2.3 and add the intruder
process. The first part of the intruder process code is that the intruder receives a
message from the client and stores it in the in local variable intercepted. The whole
process after that contains one repetition construct that involves storing messages,
choosing a message, choosing a recipient, assembling the message content and finally
sending the message.
1 active proctype Intruder () {
2 mtype msg , recpt;
3 Crypt data , intercepted;
4 do
5 :: network ? (msg , _, data) ->
6 if /* store the message */
7 :: intercepted.session = data.session;
8 intercepted.content1 = data.content1;
9 :: skip;
10 fi;
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11 }
Listing 3.14: Intruder Process
Secondly, the intruder chooses a message that is being exchanged between the client
and the server, and then at this stage the intruder chooses a recipient and assembles
the message.
2 if /* choose message type */
3 :: msg = msg1;
4 :: msg = msg2;
5 :: msg = msg3;
6 :: msg = msg4;
7 :: msg = msg5;
8 fi;
9 if /* choose a recipient */
10 :: recpt = user;
11 :: recpt = server;
12 fi;
14 if /* assemble the message */
15 :: data.session = intercepted.session;
16 data.content1 = intercepted.content1;
17
Listing 3.15: Selection Loop at Intruder Process
The final stage is to assemble the content of the message and then sends the message
Listing 3.16.
1 :: if /* assemble content1 */
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2 :: data.content1 = server;
3 :: data.content1 = user;
4 :: data.content1= login;
5 :: data.content1 = home;
6 :: data.content1 = account;
7 :: data.content1 = payment;
8 :: data.content1 = confirm;
9 :: data.content1 = logout;
10 ::skip;
11 fi;
12 fi;
13 network ! msg (recpt , data);
14 od
Listing 3.16: Method to assemble messages in Intruder Process
3.2.4.1 Simulation and Verification Results of Model with Intruder
The first result to be noticed is that the number of states increased dramatically during
the execution of the compromised model, in contrast to the secure model. Table 3.3
shows the differences between the two models. The verification run time increases to
14 seconds in the compromised model and the depth reaches the maximum limit of
9999. By default the search depth is restricted to 10,000 steps. From the results it
is clear that adding an intruder to the model can increase the number of transitions
and states. The explanation for the increase is that at each step the intruder receives
and sends the messages between the client and the server. Also, each storing and
evaluating of the content of the messages increases the number of states.
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Model Depth reached States Stored Transitions Total Memory (Mb) Time (sec)
Secure 90 2436 3838 128.827 0
Intruder 9999 14666773 33523244 1023.944 14
Table 3.3: Verification Results of the Secure and the Compromised Model.
The next stage is to analyse the order of events and timing. We add the macro
definition # define MSG printf("Time is %d n ", timer) to print the value of
the time during the run of the model. After each message is received from the server
side, Spin prints out the value of the time, and this simulates a time stamp for the
message exchange process.
Figure 3.27: Secure Model.
Figures 3.28 and 3.27 show the differences between the two models. In Figure 3.27 we
find that the client and server end the first exchange of messages at the time of value
2. While in the compromised model there was a delay of 1 time unit shown in Figure
3.28. The sequence of actions and timing were different in the compromised model.
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Figure 3.28: Model with Intruder.
3.3 Summary
This chapter presented the first model checking tool used in our research Spin. We
then modelled a web application in four different scenarios based on the requirements
of verification. The models in this chapter were reviewed by Professor Gerard Holz-
mann who complemented the work on its soundness. Concluding remarks can be
summarised as follows:
• In the model without timer 3.2.1, we showed how to verify basic web application
properties using LTL. The model without timer was presented as a basic for the
following models. We developed the model to represent the basic specifications
of an online banking system. We used the simulation and verification to ensure
the correctness of the behaviour.
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• The model with dynamic navigation 3.2.2 presented a novel approach for mod-
elling the dynamic exchange of messages based on different input from the user
of the server status.
• In the timed model 3.2.3, we developed a discrete timer that suits the require-
ments of verifying web applications’ properties without reaching the state ex-
plosion problem.
• The model with the intruder 3.2.4 proved that with the presence of an intruder
in the middle of the session there will be a difference in the sequence of timing
and actions.
In the next chapter we present the second model checking tool Uppaal, and will show
how to model web applications using a real time model checker.
Chapter 4
Modelling in UPPAAL
This chapter describes the second model checking tool Uppaal used in our research.
Firstly, background information about the Uppaal model checker is given. This will
assist later in describing how it can be used in the verification and analysis of web
applications. Then the model of a web application is designed using Uppaal. Finally,
the results of the verification will be presented.
4.1 The Uppaal Model Checker
Uppaal is a model checking tool suite for the verification of real-time systems. The
Uppaal modelling language extends the basic timed automata as defined in Chapter
2 with bounded integer variables and binary blocking synchronisation. Systems are
modelled as a set of communicating timed automata. Uppaal consists of a graph-
ical user interface that allows systems descriptions to be defined graphically and a
model-checker that combines on-the-fly verification with a symbolic technique reduc-
ing the verification problem to that of solving simple constraint systems. Furthermore,
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Uppaal also supports bounded-range integer and boolean data variables, which can
be used in the guards, assignment and location invariants [Behrmann et al., 2004,
Bengtsson and Yi, 2004].
Uppaal is considered in the area of model checking tools as a fast and usable tool.
The usability is due to the possibility of specifying the automata graphically and
the existence of a graphical simulator on which some runs could be simulated. The
efficiency is due to the fact that it restricts the type of properties checked to a reach-
ability test. Hence, the verification engine can be better optimised for the task of
reachability.
4.1.1 The Modelling Language
In this section we present a brief description of the Uppaal modelling language from
the main tool reference in Behrmann et al. [2004]. The expressions in uppaal range
over clocks and integer variables and are used with the following labels:
• Select: To represent variables that are accessible on a specific edge and they
will take a non-deterministic value in the range of their respective types.
• Guard: A guard that evaluates a boolean on clocks, integer variables, and con-
stants.
• Synchronisation: A synchronisation label that represents the channels between
processes. It uses the expression (!) to represent the action of sending or the
expression (?) to represent the action of receiving.
• Update: An update label is used to update clocks integer variables, and con-
stants and, can only be used to assign integer values to clocks.
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• Invariant: An expression on locations to satisfy conditions on clocks, integer
variables, and constants.
The main purpose of a model-checker is to verify the model specifications and to deter-
mine whether a process reaches a deadlock. uppaal’s response is either ”The property
is satisfied” or ”The property is not satisfied”. When the verifier cannot determine
the truth value of the property it responses with ”The property is maybe satisfied”.
uppaal uses a simplified version of CTL. Figure 4.1 the relationship between CTL
syntax and uppaal’s query language syntax.
CTL Formula uppaal Form
A  ϕ A [] ϕ
A ♦ ϕ A <> ϕ
E  ϕ E [] ϕ
E ♦ ϕ E <> ϕ
ϕ  ψ ϕ --> ψ
¬ ϕ not ϕ
ϕ ∧ ψ ϕ and ψ
ϕ ∨ ψ ϕ or ψ
ϕ ⇒ ψ ϕ imply ψ
Table 4.1: CTL Syntax in uppaal
The query language in Uppaal consists of path formulas and state formulas. In
summary, the formula queries available in uppaal are:
• E<> p: meaning that there exists a path where p will eventually hold.
• A[] p: meaning that for all paths p will always hold.
• E[] p: means that there exists a path where p will always hold.
• A<> p: it means that for all paths p will eventually hold.
• p --> q: meaning that whenever p holds q will eventually hold.
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Path formulas can be classified into reachability, safety and liveness. Figure 4.1 il-
lustrates the different path formulas supported by uppaal. Each type is described
below.
Figure 4.1: Path Formulas Supported in uppaal.
State Formula: Is defined as an expression that can be checked for a particular state
without looking at the behaviour of the model of [Behrmann et al., 2004]. For example,
i == 5, is true in a state whenever i equals 5. Moreover, we can verify that a process
is in a given location using an expression in the form M.l, where M is a process and l
is a location.
To check deadlocks in uppaal, we use the state formula (A[] not deadlock).
For verifying Reachability properties we check whether a given state formula, ϕ, can
possibly be satisfied by any reachable state. We use the path formula (E ♦ ϕ).
In uppaal we verify Safety properties formulated positively, e.g., something good is
invariantly true. Let ϕ be a state formula. We express that ϕ should be true in all
reachable states with the path formula (A  ϕ), whereas (E  ϕ) says that there
should exist a path such that ϕ is always true.
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Finally, for verifying Liveness Properties we use the path formula (A ♦ ϕ), which
means that ϕ is eventually satisfied. The leads to formula can be used, and it is
expressed as (ϕ→ ψ) which is read whenever ϕ is satisfied, then eventually ψ will be
satisfied.
4.1.2 Modelling Time in UPPAAL
This section will explain in detail the concept of time in uppaal. In addition, the
main concepts of the modelling language will be presented. The time model in uppaal
is represented as continuous time. It is implemented as regions and the states are thus
symbolic, which means that a state does not have any concrete value for the time, but
rather has differences [Alur and Dill, 1994]. In order to illustrate how time is modelled
in uppaal, a simple model will be used. The model uses an observer to show the
differences. An observer is an add-on automaton that takes control of detecting events
without interfering with the observed system. Figure 4.2 shows the first model with
the observer. The reset of the clock (x := 0) is assigned to the observer in order to make
it work. Time is used through clocks, in this example, x is a clock declared as clock
x; in the global declarations section. A channel is declared (reset) for synchronization
with the observer.
Figure 4.2: The Automata P1 with Obs Observer.
The channel synchronization is a hand-shaking between reset! and reset? in the
example. The clock may be reset after 2 time units. The observer detects this and
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performs the reset action. The state taken of the observer is of type committed, and
this will be explained later in this section.
Figure 4.3: Possible Behaviour of the First Example.
Figure 4.3 shows the expected behaviour of the first run. As in the previous chapter,
a verification is needed to understand the correctness of the model. At this stage, two
properties are checked as follows:
• A[] Obs.taken imply x>= 2 checks that for all states, being in the location
Obs.taken implies that x>=2.
• E<> Obs.idle and x> 3 this property checks is it possible to reach a state
where Obs is in the location idle and x>3.
When adding the properties to uppaal, the verifier checks whether it is correct or
not, as shown in Figure 4.4. When the first property was checked, uppaal returned a
result (Property is satisfied). When the value of the clock was changed to 3, uppaal
returned a negative result (Property is not satisfied). The figure also shows the second
property.
Another method of modelling and controlling time in uppaal, is by using an invariant
as a progress condition [Behrmann et al., 2004]. This means that the system is not
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Figure 4.4: uppaal Verification Example.
allowed to stay in a specific state for more than a fixed number of time units. After
that time, an action needs to be taken. As an example, when the invariant is added
to the sample example as shown in Figure 4.5, the system is not allowed to stay in
the loop location for more than 3 time units, and then the clock is reset.
Figure 4.5: uppaal Behaviour with Invariant.
Chapter 4. Modelling in Uppaal 104
By adding an invariant to locations, more verification options are possible. For ex-
ample, in contrast to the first example, now it is possible to check the following
properties:
• A[] Obs.taken imply (x>=2 and x<=3): here the property checks that the
transition is taken when the value of the clock x is in the interval [2,3].
• E<> Obs.idle and x>2: meaning that it is possible to take an action when the
value of the clock x is in the interval [2,3].
• A[] Obs.idle imply x<=3: This property ensures that the upper bond is re-
spected.
Another method of controlling time in uppaal is through adding a guard to the
channel. Figure 4.6 is the same example as before but the invariant is removed and
the guard (o x >= 2 and x <= 3) is added. By removing the progress condition
and adding a guard, the behaviour of the system is different. At this stage, the system
may reach a deadlock if the transition is not taken after 3 time units. The property
A[] x>3 imply not Obs.taken shows the deadlock scenario.
Figure 4.6: uppaal Behaviour with Guard.
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Locations in UPPAAL : There are three different locations in uppaal, normal
locations with or without invariants, urgent locations and committed locations. Each
has a different effect on time. Figure 4.7 illustrates the three types as parallel automata
with different clocks. P0 represents a normal location, P1 has the urgent location
marked by u, while P2 is committed location marked by c.
Figure 4.7: Location Types in uppaal.
In order to understand the different normal urgent locations, a property check will be
illustrated as follows:
• E<> P0.S1 and P0.x>0: In a normal location it is possible to wait in S1 of
P0.
• A[] P1.S1 imply P1.x==0: In an urgent location is is not possible to wait in
S1 of P1.
A committed location in is more restrict as the delay at a location is not allowed and
the committed location must be left in the successor state.
4.2 Modelling Web Applications in Uppaal
In this section we model a simple online banking application using Uppaal. As in
Chapter 3, we develop the model gradually in order to control the behaviour of the
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model and to have clear results. The first model will be without clocks. The second
model will contain dynamic navigation transactions. In the third model we add clocks
to the model and verify time related properties. In the final model we add an intruder
to the model and compare between a secure and compromised model. Modelling in
Uppaal is different than in Spin. The graphical design method can be more complex
to understand than using the promela language in Spin. We will compare the
differences further in Chapter 5.
4.2.1 Model without Time Constraints
The first model in Uppaal will only contain the basic properties as we did in the
Spin model in Chapter 3. We examine how to model properties without adding
clocks at this stage. The main advantage of this method of modelling is to compare
the differences later with the timed model. We consider the logical order of pages and
actions without time constraints.
The global variables used in the first model are shown in listing 3.1. We have four
main variables; page, status, Id and session. Since Uppaal does not support the
symbolic name mtype definition as in Spin we develop another method. By declaring
each page as constant variable and giving it a number, the variable page can take any
value from the constant pages when it is as a state condition between locations later
in modelling. We also created boolean variables to represent each page, which will
assist later in the verification stage. The same method is also used also for the rest of
the main variables. Status can have two values either login or error which represents
the client logging out of his account. The session variable can be valid or invalid when
the session expires.
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We declare one channel (network) between both parties. We use the update on chan-
nels to deliver each page request from the client side. For example, after the authenti-
cation, the client updates the global variable page with the constant variable account
(page = account). The advantage in this model is that the server first receives the
message on the network and uses the condition (page == account) before moving
to another page. Since we assume that the session will continue at this stage, the
condition will be true. In order to keep the order of pages correct, after each page
the client updates the global variable page to the current page request. The server
then makes the same condition for each page. We use the conditions later at the
verification stage.
The global variables session and status are used by the server to control the session.
After a successful login the server updates the status to login and the session to valid.
When the session expires then the variables are updated.
1 chan network;
2 //Pages
3 int Page;
4 const int home = 0;
5 const int account = 1;
6 const int payment = 2;
7 const int confirm = 3;
8 const int logout = 4;
9 bool A,B,C,D,E;
11 // Status
12 int Status;
13 const int login = 0;
14 const int error = 1;
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16 //Id
17 int partnerA;
18 int partnerB;
19 const int client = 0;
20 const int server =1;
22 // Session
23 int Session;
24 const int valid = 0;
25 const int invalid = 1;
26 }
The second step is to model the client by creating a new template in Uppaal. The
client template has 5 locations that represent the pages in the web application model.
We added intermediate committed locations between the main locations. The com-
mitted locations enforce that the synchronisation is atomic. We used the invariants
in the intermediate committed locations as conditions. Figure 4.8 shows the locations
and the transactions between them. From the home location to the first page we add
an extra location for the following reasons:
• The client sets the Page variable to account, representing a message content.
and uses the command network! to represent the send action.
• The partnerA variable is set to client as an id for the authentication properties.
• The middle location has an invariant that only the partnerB can receive the
message. At this point the server will set the variable partnerB to server id.
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• The next action is the receive action from the server side network?. The
client checks that he is in communication with the server with the condition
PartnerB==server and then proceeds to the account page.
The advantage of using an extra location between one location and another is that we
can update the global variables and add conditions during the exchange of messages
with the server side.
In the rest of the model, the client updates the Page variable with the page request
along with the send action network!.
Logout
Confirmation
Payment
AccountpartnerB==server
Home
network?
network!
Page = home
network? network! Page=logout
network?
network! Page = confirm
network?network!
Page = paymentpartnerB == server
network ?network!
Page = account, 
partnerA = user
Figure 4.8: Client Automaton.
The server side has the same locations as the client template but with more conditions
on edges and locations. Figure 4.9 shows the server automaton. The server has
the opposite part of the communication. The communication starts with the sever
receiving a message from the client. In the first part the server sets his id partnerB
to server, and based on the page update from the client, the server updates the page
boolean variables. A here represents the home page and it is set to false by the
server. B represents the account page and it is set to true. The middle location has
an invariant partnerA==client that states that only the partner with the id client
can login. After that, the server replies and sets the Status variable to login and
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the Session to valid. The rest of the server automaton has the same structure of
updating the pages’ boolean variables and in the logout location, the server changes
the variables to reset the session.
Logout Confirmation
PaymentAccount
partnerA==user
Home
Page==home
network!
network?
E=false,
A=true,
Session = invalid
network!
network?
D=false,
E=true
network!
network?
C = false,
D=true
network!network?
B=false,
C=truepartnerA == user
network !
Status = login,
Session = valid
network ?
partnerB = server,
B=true,
A=false
Figure 4.9: Server Automaton.
4.2.1.1 Simulation and Verification Results of Model without Time Con-
straints
In the next stage we run the simulation to gain insights into the behaviour of the
model. Figure 4.10 shows the simulator screen displyer by Uppaal. From the tran-
sitions chart we find that the middle location made it possible to represent the send
and receive action between both parties before moving to the next page. The vari-
ables section shows the value of the variable at each stage of the communication. The
verifier does not show the number of states or the verification time. It only shows
whether the property is satisfied or not. We use Uppaal’s command line (verifyta)
to show the number of states at each property.
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Figure 4.10: Simulation Result of Model without Time Constraints.
For the first model we verify the following properties:
The page reachable from the top page always has a next page in the transition. This
can be checked by verifying that there is no deadlock in the model using the formula
in 4.1.
A[] not deadlock (4.1)
We then use the command line (verifyta -u -o1 -t0 -f tracefile First.xml
First.q) to run the verifier and show the number of states. Where -u shows a
summary after verification, -o1 sets the search to depth first, -t0 generates diagnostic
information and -f writes it to the trace file. The results in 4.11 show that property
is satisfied, and the number of states is 12.
Verifying property 1 at line 2
-- Property is satisfied.
-- States stored : 12 states
-- States explored : 12 states
Figure 4.11: Verification Result of CTL Formula 4.1
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We then check that every page is reachable from the initial state. This can be done
by using the query in 4.2
E[] (Server.Home imply Server.Account) (4.2)
In query 4.3 we check that the home page is reachable from all pages.
E[] (Server.Account imply Server.Home). (4.3)
Query 4.4 verifies that the client cannot bypass the home page without the authenti-
cation process.
A[] (Server.Home imply not Client.Account) (4.4)
We use the global variables Status and Session to check that when the client is on
the account page the status is login and the session is valid.
E <> (Client.Account and Status == login and Session == valid) (4.5)
4.2.2 Modelling Dynamic Navigation
In this model of the web application we consider the dynamic behaviour of the tran-
sitions. We add edges at each page location to model different possibilities. This
step might be considered as a straightforward step in contrast to the Spin model in
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section 3.2.2. However, in the first model in section 4.2.1 we only used one channel
for the whole session as each location only had only one option. In the case of multi
options from each location, we need to declare more channels as Uppaal has a non-
deterministic choice of edges that can affect the sequence of communication between
the server and the client model. If there is only one channel and multi options the
model behaviour will not be correct, for example we may find that the server is on
the account page while the client is on the payment page during the simulation run.
Even with the use of conditions on edges we could not control the correct sequence of
pages as uppaal do not run the communication simultaneously.
In the global variables we declare another three channels for the following connection:
• channel (accountToLgout) from the account page to logout page.
• channel (paymentToLogout) from the payment page to logout page.
• channel (paymentToAccount) from the payment page back to the account page.
Figure 4.12 shows the client automata with added locations.
Logout
Confirmation
Payment
AccountpartnerB==server
Home
paymentToLogout!
Page=logoutaccountToLgout!
Page=logout
network?
paymentToAccount? paymentToAccount!Page=account
network?
network!
Page = home
network? network! Page=logout
network?
network! Page = confirm
network?network!
Page = paymentpartnerB == server
network ?network!
Page = account, 
partnerA = user
Figure 4.12: Dynamic Client Automaton.
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In Figure 4.13 the server controls the session and updates the global variables after
each change from the client side.
Logout Confirmation
PaymentAccount
partnerA==user
Home
network!
paymentToLogout?
C=false,
E=trueaccountToLgout?
B=false,
E=true
paymentToAccount! paymentToAccount?
C=false,
B=true
network!
network?
E=false,
A=true,
Status=error,
Session=invalid
network!
network?
D=false,
E=true
network!
network?
C = false,
D=true
network!
network?
B=false,
C=true
partnerA == user
network !
Status = login,
Session = valid
network ?
partnerB = server,
B=true,
A=false
Figure 4.13: Dynamic Server Automaton.
4.2.2.1 Simulation and Verification Results of Dynamic Navigation Model
We use the simulation to analyse the behaviour in the first stages of the modelling.
We first verify that there is no deadlock in the model using the query in 4.6. The
results in 4.14 show that there is no deadlock and the number of states has increased
compared to the first model in Section 4.2.1.
A[] not deadlock (4.6)
Verifying property 1 at line 11
-- Property is satisfied.
-- States stored: 14 states
-- States explored: 14 states
Figure 4.14: Verification Results of CTL Formula 4.6
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After adding the new channels the sequence of actions were correct. To verify our
approach we use the following query in 4.7 to verify that the client cannot bypass the
home page without the authentication process.
A[] (Server.Home imply not Client.Account) (4.7)
4.2.3 Modelling with Time Constraints
Including time in the model assists in representing realistic properties such as the ses-
sion management time-out mechanism. Furthermore, by adding time we can analyse
the sequence of events as done in Chapter 3. In Uppaal it is possible to use real
time clocks. However, the time is symbolic and represented as clock constraints, and
we cannot capture the value of time at each step. We only can compare the value to
integer constraints.
To add time constraints to the model, we declare a global clock that is used by the
server side as shown in listing 3.2. A constant integer MAX is declared with the value
10. We use it at the edge conditions when there is a time-out.
27 clock time;
28 const int MAX = 10;
Figure 4.15 shows the client side. We added three edges from the main pages to
represent a time-out message by the server side. The server will use the network and
send an error message. To avoid complicating the model, we did not add the dynamic
navigation properties to the current model.
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Logout
Confirmation
Payment
AccountpartnerB==server
Home
network?
network?
network?
network?
network!
Page = home
network? network! Page=logout
network?
network! Page = confirm
network?network!
Page = paymentpartnerB == server
network ?network!
Page = account, 
partnerA = user
Figure 4.15: Timed Client Automaton.
In Figure 4.16 the server uses the clock to control the session. At the start the time
value is 0. When the client is on the account page there will be two conditions: time
< MAX, then the client could proceed to the next page or; time >= MAX here the server
will send a message that the session has expired. And then the client will be redirected
to the logout page.
Logout Confirmation
PaymentAccount
partnerA==user
Home
time>=MAX
network! D=false,Status=error
time>=MAX
network!
C=false,
Status=error
time >= MAX
network!
B=false,
Status=error
network!
time = 0
network?
E=false,
A=true,
time = 0,
Status=error
network!
time < MAX
network?
D=false,
E=true
network!
time < MAX
network?
C = false,
D=true
network!
time = 0
time < MAX
network?
B=false,
C=truepartnerA == user
network !
Status = login,
Session = SessionId
network ?
partnerB = server,
B=true,
A=false
Figure 4.16: Timed Server Automaton.
4.2.3.1 Simulation and Verification Results of Timed Model
After adding the time, we can now check the value of the clock on each page with the
following queries.
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In query 4.8 we check that at a particular location a time-out can occur. We use the
same query for all the pages in our model.
E <> Client1.Account && Server1.Account&& time > MAX (4.8)
In query 4.9 we verify that a time-out will not occur when the client is active.
E[] not (Client.Account and time > MAX) (4.9)
We can also use the global variables to verify that while the login status holds, the
time will not be more than MAX as shown in 4.10.
E[] not (Status == login and time > MAX) (4.10)
4.2.4 Adding an Intruder to the Model
At this stage we add an intruder process to our model. The model process is based
on the intruder model designed by Dolev and Yao [1983]. The intruder collects in-
formation about both parties during the session. The knowledge is used during a
session to create and send messages or to tamper with other agent communication.
The intruder at first overhears and intercepts all the messages over the network. We
use the location invariant to represent that the attacker has the knowledge of the
identity of the session and participates in the communication. After receiving all the
information, the intruder becomes active and sends a new message. Figure 4.17 shows
the intruder automaton at the first location until the session id is validated. Then the
intruder uses the local variable data to store the value of the session.
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The next step is to get the communication parties’ identities and to store them in the
local variables id1 and id2. If the id2 is identified as the client, the intruder then
starts by receiving a message from either of the parties and then replies.
partnerA==user
partnerB==serverSession == SessionId
Start
network!
network? network!
id2==user
network?
id2=user
id1=serverdata = SessionId
Figure 4.17: Intruder Automaton.
We used the same client and server automaton in the timed model in section 4.2.3.
The next stage is to verify the sequence of actions and timing.
4.2.4.1 Simulation and Verification Results of Model with Intruder
To understand the model behaviour we first perform a simulation check. In Uppaal
the moment any process becomes active it can affect the other processes. When
the intruder becomes active and sends or receives messages, the sequence of events
changes. In Table 4.2 we show the differences between the two models when we did
the safety check for deadlocks. The number of states increased dramatically from 15
states to 749 states. The reason for this increase is that the communication in the
secure model was running simultaneously but after we added the intruder process the
other processes were affected and the transitions increased.
Model States Stored
Secure 15
Intruder 749
Table 4.2: Verification Results of the Secure Model and Compromised Model in
Uppaal.
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4.3 Summary
This chapter presented the second model checker used in our research Uppaal. We
first presented the tool modelling language. We then modelled a web application in
four different scenarios based on the requirements of verification. Concluding remarks
can be summarised as follows:
• In the model without timer 4.2.1, we presented how to model a web application
in Uppaal. We built a model that represents a client and server communicating
simultaneously by adding an intermediate committed location between the main
locations.
• In the model with dynamic navigation 4.2.2 we modelled the dynamic exchange
of messages based on different input from the client of the server status. How-
ever, we needed to create additional channels to represent the new actions. In
the case of the location having two edges, each process will choose a different
path.
• In the model with timed constraints 4.2.3, we declared a clock in the global
variables. We then verfived session managment properties that rely on time
constraints.
• In the model with the intruder 4.2.4 we added an intruder process. We found
that the number of states has increased. When we used the simulation we
noticed that the communication between the server and client became different
and with the presence of an intruder in the middle of the session there will be a
difference in the locations of both parties at the same time.
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In the next chapter we present a comparison between modelling web applications in
Spin and Uppaal. We discuss the differences between the results obtained from both
model checking tools. We also present the challenges of modelling web applications.
Chapter 5
Comparison
In this chapter we compare between the results from Spin and Uppaal and highlight
final remarks from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Firstly, we introduce the Spin modelling
challenges and compare it with Uppaal. We then compare between the different
modelling properties in both tools. We then discuss the intruder model. Finally we
list a summary of the chapter.
5.1 Modelling Web Applications in Spin
The Spin model checker [Holzmann, 2004] was developed to verify communication
protocols. It has been used in successful examples [D’Argenio et al., 1997, Joesang,
1995]. Spin has two main sections, the simulator and the verifier. Firstly in the
simulator we can gain insights into the model under development, eliminating design
mistakes and analysing the system behaviour. On the other hand, the verifier has an
expressive number of verification options beside the LTL reasoning. We presented a
full description of the Spin model checker in Chapter 3
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We modelled a simple web application in Chapter 3. We used most of Spin’s features
to simulate and verify web applications’ properties. The model was developed grad-
ually to ensure that the behaviour is easy to understand and also that the results are
correct. We list each model below and discuss the challenges.
The first model in section 3.2.1 had one session of the client logging into his/her online
banking account to make a simple transaction and the model then terminates at the
end of the run. We examined the basic properties of authentication, navigation and
session management at this stage of the model. Since we started with a basic model,
evolving and adding functions was considered easy after understanding the basics
of the modelling input language Promela. The first challenge in the first model
is understanding how not to reach a deadlock. When modelling with channels it is
possible that there will be a model timeout during the simulation if there is no further
action from the processes, and this is not considered a termination of the processes.
When using the verifier the result will show an error meaning there is a deadlock. The
way to solve this is by examining the channel’s send and receive operations. Each send
transition must have a receive in the other process in order for the model to be correct.
Understanding the repetition and selection loops could also be a challenge. The selec-
tion construct if-fi ends when there are no other options to select in the construct,
while the repetition loop do-od keeps going back to the start and choosing another
statement. Both constructs are equally important, for example we mostly used the
repetition loop do-od client process and we only needed the client to keep sending
messages to navigate in the session. The server side mostly used the selection loop
if-fi to examine and check the statements and conditions before replying.
In the first model simulation and verification section we verified the following proper-
ties as listed in the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard [Stock et al.,
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2014] as Table 5.1 shows:
Property Description
1 The page is reachable from the top page and always has a next page in
the transition.
2 Every page is reachable from the top page.
3 The top page is reachable from all pages.
4 Eventually a chosen-page is visited.
5 The first page is the login-page and the next page is either the login-
error-page or the home-page.
6 Whenever the login-page is visited, the next page is either the login-error-
page or the login-success-page.
7 Verify that sessions are invalidated when the user logs out.
8 Verify that all pages and resources require authentication except those
specifically intended to be public
9 Verify that all authentication controls are enforced on the server side.
10 Verify that re-authentication is required before any application-specific
sensitive operations are permitted as per the risk profile of the applica-
tion.
Table 5.1: Web Applications’ Properties Stock et al. [2014].
In the second model in section 3.2.2 we modelled a dynamic page navigation where
different input leads to different pages. We kept the model simple and verified dynamic
navigation properties. The model illustrates two main principles of modelling; firstly,
understanding how the model checker executes the processes improves the accuracy
of the results. The statements’ execution behaviour in Promela is conditional on its
”enabledness” [Holzmann, 2004] and statements are either blocked or enabled based
on the condition. Since we use an unbuffered channel we had to ensure that the
communication is executed simultaneously, otherwise if any of the parties receives
an unexpected message the process will block. We designed a method in which it is
possible to include all the possibilities under each page block, and in Promela we
used the labels identifiers to represent pages.
The second modelling principle is deciding whether the model should terminate or
have an infinite number of sequences. During the modelling we need to ensure that
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the model is correct for the intended verification formula. As stated by [Clarke, 2008]:
“ We used the term Model Checking because we wanted to determine if the temporal
formula f was true in the Kripke structure M , i.e., whether the structure M was
a model for the formula f. Some people believe erroneously that the use of the term
model refers to the dictionary meaning of this word (e.g., a miniature representation
of something or a pattern of something to be made) and indicates that we are dealing
with an abstraction of the actual system under study.”
By ensuring the model will be correct for the formula, we checked more properties
such as that the session expires after the client logs out by ensuring that the model
is infinite. Furthermore, we varied the sequence of pages on different properties by
using LTL.
In the third model we introduce a novel approach for modelling discrete time in Spin.
We add an extra process that controls the time, and we then verify properties that rely
on time constraints, such as session management properties. In the method presented
in section 3.2.3 we designed a discrete timer to suit the verification requirements of web
applications. The properties we verified related to security and session management as
listed in The OWASP Application Security Verification Standard Stock et al. [2014].
The assertions added to the model ensured that during an active session the timing
will not exceed a fixed period. Though the number of states and transitions has
increased, we did not reach a state explosion problem as the model was kept simple
to verify the properties efficiently.
The final model in section 3.2.4 includes an intruder that becomes active in the middle
of the communication. We examine the difference in the sequence of actions and the
timing between a secure model and a compromised model. We use the timer process
from model 3.2.3 and we add the intruder process.
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The first result to be noticed is that the number of states increased dramatically during
the execution of the compromised model in contrast to the secure model. Furthermore,
the verification run time increased to 14 seconds in the compromised model and the
depth reach its limit of 9999.
The results verifies that the presence of an intruder in the communication increases the
number of transitions and states. We used the default safety verification for deadlocks
to obtain the results.
The next stage analyses the order of events and timing. We added the macro definition
# define MSG printf("Time is %d n ", timer) to print the value of the time
during the run of the model. After each message received from the server side, Spin
prints out the value of the time, and this simulates a time stamp for the message
exchange process. The simulation charts identified that the sequence of transactions
were different between the models. The timing values after the first exchange of
messages were different.
5.2 Modelling Web Applications in Uppaal
We used Uppaal to model a simple web application in Chapter 5. The model was
developed gradually as we did in the Spin chapter to ensure that the behaviour is
easy to understand and also that the results are correct. We list each model bellow
and discuss the challenges.
At the first model in section 4.2.1 we focused on developing an accurate model with
the basic properties. We did not include the time constraints at this stage. The first
challenge we found is how to model a realistic channel that can pass values with each
message. In Uppaal the update on the edge from the sender is always evaluated
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before the update of the edge with the receiver, and the receiver can access the data
written by the sender in the same transition. But in our model we needed a condition
to check the value of the message, and the guards of the edges are evaluated before the
updates are executed, i.e., before the receiver in the communication has access to the
value. We modified the conditional two-way synchronous value passing in the 4.2.1
method to suit our model. We added intermediate committed locations between the
main locations. The committed locations enforce that the synchronisation is atomic.
We used the invariants in the intermediate committed locations as conditions.
In the second model in section 4.2.2 we verified dynamic navigation properties. We
used the same value passing method as in the first model 4.2.1. The challenge was
that when a location has more than one option both processes will act differently if the
same channel is used for both actions. We then added channels for each extra action
so the server and client will execute simultaneously. We then verified our approach
by verifying that the client cannot bypass the authentication page.
In the third model in section 4.2.3 we added a global clock that we used to control the
session. With the time constraints we verified properties such as the session is active
and the session does not reach a timeout. We also used locations to verify session
management properties such as if the client is on the account page and we checked
the time constraints.
In the last model in section 4.2.4, we introduced an intruder process to check the
differences between a secure and a compromised model as done in the Spin model.
The number of states increased dramatically from 15 states to 749 states. The reason
for this increase is that the communication in the secure model was running simul-
taneously but after the intruder started receiving and sending messages each process
was affected and the transitions increased.
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5.3 Comparison
In this section we make comparison between the Spin and Uppaal model checkers in
verifying web applications. In Table 5.2 we show the difference between the number of
states from both model checkers. The number of states increased with the increase in
the complexity of each model. Each of the model checkers has a different verification
background language. In Spin each change in the integer values, conditions, and
jump statements is stored as a state, whereas in Uppaal only the changes between
locations are stored. In Spin the number of states increased from 53 states in the
model without time to 92 states in the dynamic navigation model as we added more
transactions between the client and the server.
In the models without the intruder in Uppaal; the server and client exchanged the
messages simultaneously. When we added the intruder to the Uppaal model, there
was a change in the execution behaviour of the model as each of the communication
parties were in a different location at a specific time unit, hence the increase in the
number of states from 15 states to 749 states.
Model Model without Time Dynamic Navigation Model Timed Model Model with Intruder
Spin 53 92 1182 14666773
Uppaal 12 14 15 749
Table 5.2: Comparison of Number of States between Spin and Uppaal.
In the following part of this section we answer the questions we posed in Chapter 1.6.
Q1 How complex and expressive is the input language of the model checking tool to
cover the properties of the web applications?
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In Spin’s input language Promela becoming familiar with the basis of the
language was not complex. The basic processes and channels made it suitable for
our research. We benefited from the symbolic names mtype that represented the
messages in the communication. From the first stages of modelling we managed
to have a sequence chart of the client and server communicating during the
simulation stage. This advantage assisted in understanding the behaviour of
the model and also the Promela language itself. The complexity was from the
verification using LTL, as it was difficult to understand how to formalize the
logic of the model in order to suit the formula during the verification. In some
of the LTL formulas we needed to make some changes to the model in order to
get the correct results. The process of changes improved the final model, and
also developed an understanding of how the verification runs. The Promela
language is expressive enough to cover most of the web application properties if
the modelling process is carried out correctly.
In Uppaal developing the model using the graphical editor was easy to un-
derstand. However, we faced the challenge of having a correct representation
of the web application. At the first stages we assumed that both processes in
the model would run simultaneously by exchanging messages and moving to the
next state. This is not true in Uppaal, as for modelling web application we
needed to add conditions on locations, and value passing through channels as
we did in Spin. The process of creating the channels, messages and conditions
in Uppaal is more complex than in Spin. The guards of the edges are eval-
uated before the updates are executed from both processes, So we found that
we need to add extra intermediate committed locations the between main loca-
tions. When we added the intruder process to the model, we faced the problem
of the processes not running simultaneously, hence the increase in the number
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of states in the compromised model. A solution to the problem was to create
a broadcast channel, but we cannot add time conditions to edges as it is not
allowed in broadcast channels. Uppaal can assist in verifying basic properties
such as reachability and invariants, but the verification temporal logic used is a
simplified subset of CTL.
Q2 To what extent can property specification language be adaptable to specify web
application properties?
In Spin we found that using the LTL patterns assisted in specifying all the
proposed properties in the background chapter. However, in Uppaal we could
not verify properties such as precedence and response formulas to verify the
sequence of actions that we used in the Spin chapter. We only verified in
Uppaal the basic properties along with the clock constraints.
Q3 How capable is the model checker verifying the model without resulting in a state
explosion problem?
The approach we used in modelling assisted in avoiding over modelling the
design. We started by modelling the simplest possible description of the com-
munication between the client and the server. We then focused on capturing the
essential system characteristics to be analysed. We developed the model grad-
ually and used the tools simulation and verification after each addition to the
model. Since the model was small we did not face any issues in the verification
stage. The advantage of this approach is managing the complexity of modelling
and avoiding errors in the early stages.
Q4 How are the results different when integrating a simple timing constraint to Spin,
in contrast to Uppaal which is based on timed automata specifications?
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Adding discrete time to Spin was a challenging task, The timer process should
run simultaneously with other processes in the model. If there was a deadlock in
any process, the timer process would reach an infinite loop resulting in a failure
execution of the model. Correspondingly, a timer could be integrated to suit
the verification requirements. The main advantage of modelling time in Spin
is that we were able to have the value of time in each step of the model. In
Uppaal the value of the clock is treated symbolically and the clock values are
not represented in real numbers, but rather as clock constraints.
5.4 Summary
This chapter presented the model results summary obtained from the Spin and Up-
paal modelling chapters. We then discussed the differences between both model
checkers to verify web applications. In the next chapter we summarise the research
results, highlight the research limitations and provide directions and areas for future
research.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This chapter summarises the work done in this thesis. In section 6.1 we summarise the
main results of this research. Section 6.2 presents a review of the thesis contributions
and outstanding issues. In section 6.3 we discuss the directions of future research.
6.1 An Overview of the Research
We started the thesis in Chapter 1 with a brief description of web applications chal-
lenges, properties, formal methods and the advantages of using model checking for
the verification of web applications.
In Chapter 2 we summarised the background on web application fundamentals and
properties, and provided a comparison of the analysis and verification methods found
in the literature. The model checking theory used in this research was then described.
We then compared the temporal logics LTL and CTL. We then showed the temporal
logic patterns that were used in expressing the web application properties in Chapter
3.
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In Chapter 3 we presented the Spin and its input language Promela. Firstly, we
presented an overview of the tool language and advantages and our justification for
using it for modelling web applications. Secondly, as Spin does not support the
modelling time concept, the integration of time into Promela is discussed, along
with examples from the existing literature. We then used a detailed approach for
modelling a web application example (on-line banking web application). We presented
discussion of the verification options in Spin. The result shows that it is possible to
model basic web applications properties using either assertions or LTL formulas. We
proposed a novel approach for modelling the dynamic behaviour of web applications.
We then designed a discrete-time process to verify realistic properties, The verification
results proved that it is possible to model time in Spin and to verify the properties
without causing a state explosion problem. Finally, we used the timing process to
study the sequence of actions and timestamps when an intruder is added to the model.
The results showed a difference in the sequence of actions and timing, along with an
increase in the number of states, memory and verification time.
Chapter 4 presented the second model checking tool Uppaal. We first gave an
overview of the tool modelling language and verification options. We then showed
a simple example to understand modelling with real time. We then used the same ap-
proach shown in 3 to gradually model a web application and to analyse the behaviour
of the model after each stage. We then verified the properties using the verifier in
Uppaal.
In Chapter 5 we presented the results from Spin and Uppaal. We then compared
between both tools in the context of verifying web applications.
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6.2 Summary of Thesis Contributions to Research
Areas
In this section we review the main contributions achieved in this thesis. We list the
contributions in three categories as follows:
6.2.1 Contributions to Model Checking Web Applications
Firstly, the challenges in adopting model checking for the analysis and verification of
web applications were critically reviewed. The usage of model checking is examined
for the critical properties of web applications, such as security and navigation proper-
ties. After providing a sound background on the current challenges in verifying web
applications, methods are devised to develop more secure and easy-to-maintain web
applications.
Secondly, a novel approach for time constraints was integrated into the spin model
checker to enable the modelling of web application properties. We used spin’s existing
abilities to design realistic web application models. This enabled the expression of
issues, such as modelling session management properties and dynamic navigation
properties, where a time-out can lead to different pages. Chapter 3 describes the
steps in modelling time constraints in Spin.
In addition to modelling the static properties of web applications, a novel approach was
developed for modelling the dynamic properties of web applications [Alalfi et al., 2009],
in which a single input can lead to different pages based on time constraints and server
state. As highlighted in the literature review, there is a gap in modelling the dynamic
navigation properties of web applications. Our research shows how it is possible to
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model web applications using the model checking tool’s existing capabilities, which is
detailed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
6.2.2 Contributions to Model Checking Timed Models of Web
Applications
The model checker Uppaal is presented in the literature [Ben-Ari, 2008, Ruys and
Holzmann, 2004] as an alternative in Spin when modelling real-time systems. By
integrating discrete time to Spin we had the advantage of analysing and understanding
the behaviour of the model using the timestamps of actions and messages. Whereas
in Uppaal the value of time was treated symbolically and the clock values are not
represented by real numbers, but rather as clock constraints. The differences were
analysed in Chapter 5.
6.2.3 Contributions to Modelling Security Properties of Ap-
plications
By using our approach of analysing the time sequence and action sequence of different
web application models. The difference between a secure session and a compromised
session with the presence of an intruder can be identified by the differences between
time, number of states and behaviour complexity. Understanding the web applica-
tion behaviour in different scenarios leads to a better understanding of the behaviour,
improved security and more stable development. In addition, analysing different se-
quences of model runs can assist in developing security detection methods [Carl et al.,
2006, Kruegel et al., 2005] that rely on quantitative measurements such as difference
in time and memory as presented in Chapter 3.
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6.3 Future Work
Web applications are evolving rapidly nowadays, and finding new methods to ensure
design correctness is important. Web applications are different to other applications
and systems due to their complex structure and technologies [Alalfi et al., 2009, Li and
Xue, 2014]. The web applications models we created in our approach can be adapted
to other communication protocols such as security protocols and ad-hoc routing pro-
tocols. In addition, the security and navigation properties we verified in this work can
be used in applications that share the same specifications. Below we discuss future
direction:
• To find a link between the research and industry in using model checking. We
believe that developing model templates and frameworks for the verification of
web applications could assist in simplifying the process. In addition, verification
options should be added to each template.
• The implementation used in our research is applicable to other types of appli-
cations, such as mobile applications, ad-hoc routing protocols and multi-agent
systems.
• Our approach of analysing the sequence of actions with an intruder is added to
the model, which could assist in understanding other different types of attack
in the area of the quantitative detection of web applications attacks.
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Appendix A
Promela code is listed here as mentioned in Chapter 3.
(A) Model without Time Constraints
1 #define p (Server@HomePage)
2 #define q (Server@AccountPage)
3 #define r (Server@PaymentPage)
4 #define s (Server@ConfirmtPage)
5 #define z (Server@Logoutpage)
6 #define m (Status == login)
7 mtype = {ok , err , ack , msg1 , msg2 , msg3 , msg4 , msg5 , msg6 ,
sessionID , user , server , password };
8 mtype = {home , account , payment , confirm , logout , error ,
login};
10 typedef Crypt { mtype session , content1}
12 chan network = [0] of {mtype , /* msg# */
13 mtype , /* receiver */
14 Crypt };
15 /* global variables for verification */
16 mtype partnerA , partnerB;
17 mtype statusA = err;
18 mtype statusB = err;
19 mtype page = err;
20 mtype Status = err;
21 active proctype Server () {
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23 mtype sessionId; /* session id that we receive from the
User */
24 Crypt messageSU; /* encrypted message to the user
*/
25 Crypt data; /* received encrypted message
*/
26 partnerB = user;
27 messageSU.session = sessionId;
28 messageSU.content1 = server;
30 HomePage: page = home;
32 network? msg1 (partnerB , data);
34 if:: (data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1
== user) ->
36 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU);
38 statusA = ok; Status = login; goto
AccountPage;
40 ::else -> goto HomePage;
41 fi;
42 AccountPage:
44 network? msg2 (partnerB , data);
45 if::( data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1
== account) -> page = account;network ! ack (partnerB ,
messageSU);goto PaymentPage;
46 ::else -> goto HomePage;
47 fi;
48 PaymentPage:
50 network? msg3 (partnerB , data);
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52 if::( data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1
== payment) -> page = payment;network ! ack (partnerB ,
messageSU);goto ConfirmtPage;
53 ::else -> goto HomePage;
54 fi;
56 ConfirmtPage:
58 network? msg4 (partnerB , data);
59 if::( data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1
== confirm) -> page = confirm;network ! ack (partnerB ,
messageSU);
60 ::else -> goto HomePage;
61 fi;
62 Logoutpage: Status = logout
64 network? msg5 (partnerB , data);
65 if::( data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1
== logout) -> page = home; statusA = err; network ! ack
(partnerB , messageSU);
66 ::else -> goto HomePage;
67 fi;
68 }
69 active proctype User() {
70 mtype sessionId; /* nonce that we receive from the
Server */
71 Crypt messageUS; /* encrypted message to Server
*/
72 Crypt data; /* received encrypted message
*/
74 A:
75 partnerA = server;
78 /* login messgae */
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80 messageUS.session = sessionId;
81 messageUS.content1 = user;
84 network! msg1 (partnerA , messageUS);
86 network? ack (partnerA , data);
88 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1 == server)
90 statusB = ok;
92 B:
93 /* Second messgae */
95 messageUS.session = sessionId;
96 messageUS.content1 = account;
98 network! msg2 (partnerA , messageUS);
99 network? ack (partnerA , data);
101 C:
102 /* Third messgae */
104 messageUS.session = sessionId;
105 messageUS.content1 = payment;
107 network! msg3 (partnerA , messageUS);
108 network? ack (partnerA , data);
110 D:
111 /* forth messgae */
112 messageUS.session = sessionId;
113 messageUS.content1 = confirm;
114 network! msg4 (partnerA , messageUS);
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115 network? ack (partnerA , data);
117 E:
118 /* fifth messgae */
119 messageUS.session = sessionId;
120 messageUS.content1 = logout;
121 network! msg5 (partnerA , messageUS);
122 network? ack (partnerA , data);statusB = err;
124 }
125 /*ltl p0 { <> (partnerA == server && partnerB ==user) -> <>(
statusA == ok && statusB == ok) }*/
126 /*ltl p1 { <> (statusA == ok && statusB == ok) }*/
127 /* ltl p2 { [](( page == account) -> <>(statusA == ok &&
statusB == ok) ) }*/
128 /* ltl p3 { [] (( Server@PaymentPage) -> (Status == login))
} */
129 /*ltl p4 { [](P -> <>R ) }*/
130 /*ltl p5 { [](!Q || <>(Q && <>P)) }*/
131 /*ltl m1 { !M W P}*/
132 /*ltl p7 { [](p && !z -> (!z U (m && !z))) } */
133 /* ltl p8 { [](z -> <>m) } */
134 /* ltl p9 { <> (q && m) } */
(B) Dynamic Navigation Model
1 #define p (Server@HomePage)
2 #define q (Server@AccountPage)
3 #define r (Server@PaymentPage)
4 #define s (Server@ConfirmtPage)
5 #define z (Server@Logoutpage)
6 #define m (Status == login)
8 mtype = { ok , err , ack ,
9 msg1 , msg2 , msg3 , msg4 , msg5 , msg6 ,
10 sessionID , user , server , password
11 }
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13 mtype = {
14 home , account , payment , confirm , logout , error ,
login
15 }
16 typedef Crypt { mtype session , content1 }
18 chan network = [0] of { mtype , /* msg# */
19 mtype , /* receiver */
20 Crypt }
21 /* global variables for verification */
22 mtype partnerA = server
23 mtype partnerB = user
24 mtype statusA = err
25 mtype statusB = err
26 mtype page = err
27 mtype Status = err
28 active proctype Server ()
29 { mtype sessionId /* session that we receive from
the User */
30 Crypt messageSU /* encrypted message to the user
*/
31 Crypt data /* received encrypted message
*/
33 messageSU.session = sessionId
34 messageSU.content1 = server
36 HomePage:
37 page = home /* LOGIN ONLY */
39 if
40 :: network ? msg1 (partnerB , data)->
41 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.
content1 == user) ->
42 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
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43 statusA = ok
44 Status = login
46 fi
48 AccountPage: assert(Status == login)
49 if
50 :: network? msg2 (partnerB , data)->
/* Move to Payment Page*/
51 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.
content1 == account) ->
52 page = account
53 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
54 goto PaymentPage
56 :: network ? msg5 (partnerB , data) ->
/* Client request logout */
58 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.
content1 == logout) ->
59 page = home;network ! ack (partnerB ,
messageSU)
60 statusA = err
61 Status = logout
62 goto HomePage
64 fi
66 PaymentPage: assert(Status == login)
67 if
68 :: network? msg3 (partnerB , data) ->
/* Move to Confirmation Page*/
69 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.
content1 == payment) ->
70 page = payment
71 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
Appendix A. Spin Code 152
72 goto ConfirmtPage
74 :: network ? msg2 (partnerB , data) ->
/* Go back to Account Page*/
76 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.
content1 == account) ->
77 page = account
78 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
79 goto AccountPage;
81 :: network ? msg5 (partnerB , data) ->
/* Client request logout */
83 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.
content1 == logout) ->
84 page = home;network ! ack (partnerB ,
messageSU)
85 statusA = err
86 Status = logout
87 goto HomePage
89 fi
90 ConfirmtPage: assert(Status == login)
92 if
93 :: network? msg4 (partnerB , data) ->
94 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.
content1 == confirm) ->
95 page = confirm
96 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
98 :: network ? msg2 (partnerB , data) ->
/* Go back to Account Page*/
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100 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.
content1 == account) ->
101 page = account
102 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
103 goto AccountPage;
105 fi
106 Logoutpage: assert (Status == login); Status = logout
107 network? msg5 (partnerB , data)
108 if
109 :: (data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1
== logout) ->
110 page = home;network ! ack (partnerB ,
messageSU)
111 statusA = err
112 goto HomePage
113 :: else ->
114 goto HomePage
115 fi
116 }
117 active proctype User()
118 { mtype sessionId /* nonce that we receive from the
Server */
119 Crypt messageUS /* encrypted message to Server */
120 Crypt data /* received encrypted message */
122 A: /* Home Page */
123 messageUS.session = sessionId
124 messageUS.content1 = user
125 network! msg1 (partnerA , messageUS)
126 network? ack (partnerA , data)
127 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.content1 ==
server)
128 statusB = ok
130 B: /* Account Page */
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131 do
132 :: messageUS.session = sessionId;messageUS.content1
= account
133 network! msg2 (partnerA , messageUS)
134 network? ack (partnerA , data)->goto C;
135 :: messageUS.session = sessionId; messageUS.
content1 = logout;
136 network! msg5 (partnerA , messageUS);
137 network? ack (partnerA , data)->statusB = err;
goto A;
138 od;
140 C: /* Payment Page */
141 do
142 :: messageUS.session = sessionId; messageUS.
content1 = payment;
143 network! msg3 (partnerA , messageUS);
144 network? ack (partnerA , data)->goto D;
145 :: messageUS.session = sessionId; messageUS.
content1 = account;
146 network! msg2 (partnerA , messageUS);
147 network? ack (partnerA , data)->goto B;
148 :: messageUS.session = sessionId; messageUS.
content1 = logout;
149 network! msg5 (partnerA , messageUS);
150 network? ack (partnerA , data)->statusB = err;
goto A;
151 od;
152 D: /* Confirmation Page */
153 do
154 :: messageUS.session = sessionId
155 messageUS.content1 = confirm
156 network! msg4 (partnerA , messageUS)
157 network? ack (partnerA , data)->goto E;
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159 :: messageUS.session = sessionId; messageUS.
content1 = account;
160 network! msg2 (partnerA , messageUS);
161 network? ack (partnerA , data)->goto B;
163 od;
164 E: /* Logout Page */
165 messageUS.session = sessionId
166 messageUS.content1 = logout
167 network! msg5 (partnerA , messageUS)
168 network? ack (partnerA , data)
169 statusB = err
170 goto A
171 }
172 ltl p1 { !r U q }
173 /*ltl r1 { [](q -> <>r || <> z || <>p) }*/
(C) Model with Timed Constraints
1 #define p (Server@HomePage)
2 #define q (Server@AccountPage)
3 #define r (Server@PaymentPage)
4 #define s (Server@ConfirmtPage)
5 #define z (Server@Logoutpage)
6 #define m (timer < MAX)
7 #define MSG printf("Status is %e\n", Status)
9 mtype = { ok , err , ack ,
10 msg1 , msg2 , msg3 , msg4 , msg5 , msg6 ,
11 sessionID ,invalid ,valid , user , server , password
12 }
14 mtype = {
15 home , account , payment , confirm , logout , error ,
login
16 }
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18 typedef Crypt { mtype session , content1 }
20 chan network = [0] of { mtype , /* msg# */
21 mtype , /* receiver */
22 Crypt }
23 /* global variables for verification */
24 mtype partnerA = server
25 mtype partnerB = user
26 mtype statusA = err
27 mtype statusB = err
28 mtype page = err
29 mtype Status = err
30 mtype Session = err
31 byte timer ;
32 byte MAX = 2;
34 byte flag;
35 byte flag2;
36 byte flag3;
37 byte flag4;
38 proctype Clock ()
40 { do
41 :: atomic {timer < MAX -> timer ++} skip;
42 ::else -> atomic {timer == MAX -> timer = 0} skip;
43 od;
44 }
46 proctype Server ()
47 { mtype sessionId /* session that we receive from
the User */
48 Crypt messageSU /* encrypted message to the user
*/
49 Crypt data /* received encrypted message
*/
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53 HomePage:
54 page = home /* LOGIN ONLY */
55 messageSU.session = sessionId
56 messageSU.content1 = server
58 if
59 :: network ? msg1 (partnerB , data)-> atomic {
60 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.
content1 == user) ->
61 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
62 statusA = ok
63 Session = valid
64 Status = login }
65 skip;
66 fi
68 AccountPage: /* assert (timer <= MAX && Session == valid &&
Status == login)*/
70 if
71 :: network? msg2 (partnerB , data)-> if
72 /*
Move to Payment Page*/
73 :: atomic {(data.session == sessionId) &&
(data.content1 == account)&&( timer < MAX) ->
74 page = account ;timer = 0
76 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
77 goto PaymentPage ;} skip;
78 ::else -> atomic {Session = invalid;
79 network!error (partnerB , messageSU);Status =
logout;flag ++; MSG;goto HomePage ;} skip;
80 fi;
81 fi
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83 PaymentPage: /* assert (timer <= MAX && Session ==
valid && Status == login)*/
85 if
86 :: network? msg3 (partnerB , data) -> if
87
/* Move to Confirmation Page*/
88 :: atomic {(data.session == sessionId) && (
data.content1 == payment) &&( timer < MAX)->
89 page = payment;timer = 0
90 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)
91 goto ConfirmedPage ;} skip;
93 :: else -> atomic {Session = invalid;
94 network!error (partnerB , messageSU);
Status = logout;flag2 ++; MSG;goto HomePage ;} skip;
95 fi
96 fi
98 ConfirmedPage: /* assert (timer <= MAX && Session == valid
&& Status == login)*/
100 if
101 :: network? msg4 (partnerB , data) -> if
102 :: atomic {(data.session == sessionId) && (
data.content1 == confirm) &&( timer < MAX)->
103 page = confirm;timer = 0
104 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU);}skip;
106 :: else -> atomic {Session = invalid;
107 network!error (partnerB , messageSU);
Status = logout;flag3 ++; MSG;goto HomePage ;}skip;
108 fi
110 fi
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112 Logoutpage: /* assert (timer <= MAX && Session == valid &&
Status == login)*/
113 network? msg5 (partnerB , data)
114 if
115 :: atomic {(data.session == sessionId) && (data.
content1 == logout) &&( timer < MAX)->
116 page = logout;network ! ack (partnerB ,
messageSU)
117 statusA = err
118 Status = logout
119 timer = 0
120 Session = invalid;
121 goto HomePage ;}skip;
123 :: else -> atomic {Session = invalid;
124 network!error (partnerB , messageSU);
Status = logout;flag4 ++; MSG;goto HomePage ;} skip;
125 fi;
126 }
128 proctype User()
129 { mtype sessionId /* nonce that we receive from the
Server */
130 Crypt messageUS /* encrypted message to Server */
131 Crypt data /* received encrypted message */
133 A: /* Home Page */
134 messageUS.session = sessionId
135 messageUS.content1 = user
137 network! msg1 (partnerA , messageUS)
138 network? ack (partnerA , data)
139 if ::
140 (data.session == sessionId) && (data.
content1 == server) ->
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141 statusB = ok ;skip; fi;
143 B: /* Account Page */
144 do
145 :: messageUS.session = sessionId;messageUS.content1
= account
146 network! msg2 (partnerA , messageUS)
147 if
148 :: network? ack (partnerA , data)->goto C
;skip;
149 :: if :: network? error (partnerA , data)
-> statusB = err; goto A; skip; fi;
150 fi;
151 od;
153 C: /* Payment Page */
154 do
155 :: messageUS.session = sessionId; messageUS.
content1 = payment;
156 network! msg3 (partnerA , messageUS);
157 if
158 :: network? ack (partnerA , data)->goto D;
skip;
159 ::if:: network? error(partnerA , data)->
statusB = err;goto A; skip;fi;
160 fi;
162 od;
163 D: /* Confirmation Page */
164 do
165 :: messageUS.session = sessionId
166 messageUS.content1 = confirm
167 network! msg4 (partnerA , messageUS)
168 if
169 :: network? ack (partnerA , data)->goto E;
skip;
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170 ::if:: network? error (partnerA , data)->
statusB = err;goto A; skip;fi;
171 fi;
172 od;
174 E: /* Logout Page */
175 do
176 :: messageUS.session = sessionId
177 messageUS.content1 = logout
178 network! msg5 (partnerA , messageUS)
179 if
181 :: network? ack (partnerA , data)-> statusB
= err; goto A;skip;
182 ::if:: network? error(partnerA , data) ->
statusB = err;goto A; fi; skip;
184 fi;
185 od;
186 }
187 /*ltl p1 { [](q -> [](!m)) }*/
188 /*ltl u5 { [](( Session == valid) && !( Session == invalid)
-> (( Status == logout) W (Session == invalid))) }*/
189 /*ltl e3 { [](! Server@PaymentPage || <>(Server@PaymentPage
&& <> (!timer == MAX))) }*/
190 /*ltl a1 { <> (Session == valid) || (Session == invalid)
|| (Session == 0) }*/
191 /*ltl p1 { <> (statusA == err && statusB == err) }*/
192 /*ltl p2 { ![](( Status == logout) -> <>(statusA == ok &&
statusB == ok) ) }*/
193 /*ltl p3 { [] (( Server@PaymentPage) -> [](! timer == MAX))
}*/
194 init{
195 run User(); run Clock(); run Server ()}
(D) Model with an Intruder A: Secure Model
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1 #define MSG printf("Time is %d\n", timer)
3 mtype = { ok , err , ack ,
4 msg1 , msg2 , msg3 , msg4 , msg5 , msg6 ,
5 sessionId , user , server , intruder ,
6 }
8 mtype = {
9 home , account , payment , confirm , logout , error ,
login
10 }
12 typedef Crypt { mtype session , content1 }
14 chan network = [0] of { mtype , /* msg# */
15 mtype , /* receiver */
16 Crypt }
18 /* global variables for verification */
19 mtype partnerA;
20 mtype partnerB;
21 mtype statusA = err
22 mtype statusB = err
23 mtype page = err
24 mtype Status = err
25 byte timer;
26 byte MAX = 20;
29 proctype Clock ()
30 {
32 do
33 :: atomic {timer < MAX -> timer ++} skip;
34 ::else -> atomic {timer == MAX} skip;
35 break
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36 od;
39 }
40 proctype Server ()
41 {
42 Crypt messageSU /* encrypted message to the user
*/
43 Crypt data /* received encrypted message
*/
44 messageSU.session = sessionId
45 messageSU.content1 = 0
46 HomePage:
47 page = home
48 atomic{network ? msg1 , partnerB (data);MSG
49 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU);
50 statusA = ok
51 Status = login} skip;
53 AccountPage:
54 atomic{network? msg2 , partnerB (data);MSG
56 page = account
57 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU);
58 goto PaymentPage} skip;
60 PaymentPage:
61 atomic{network? msg3 , partnerB (data);MSG
63 page = payment
64 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU);
65 goto ConfirmedPage} skip;
68 ConfirmedPage:
69 atomic{network? msg4 , partnerB (data);MSG
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71 page = confirm
72 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)} skip;
76 Logoutpage:
77 atomic{network? msg5 , partnerB (data);MSG
79 page = home;network ! ack (partnerB ,
messageSU);
80 statusA = err
81 Status = logout; goto HomePage} skip;
84 }
85 proctype User()
86 {
87 Crypt messageUS /* encrypted message to Server */
88 Crypt data /* received encrypted message */
90 if
91 :: partnerA = intruder;
92 :: partnerA = server;
93 fi;
95 A: /* login message */
96 atomic{messageUS.session = sessionId
97 messageUS.content1 = login
98 network! msg1 ,partnerA , messageUS;
99 network? ack (partnerA , data);
100 statusB = ok} skip;
102 B: /* second message */
103 atomic{messageUS.session = sessionId
104 messageUS.content1 = account
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105 network! msg2 (partnerA , messageUS);
106 network? ack (partnerA , data);} skip;
108 C: /* third message */
109 atomic{messageUS.session = sessionId
110 messageUS.content1 = payment
111 network! msg3 (partnerA , messageUS);
112 network? ack (partnerA , data);} skip;
114 D: /* fourth message */
115 atomic{messageUS.session = sessionId
116 messageUS.content1 = confirm
117 network! msg4 (partnerA , messageUS);
118 network? ack (partnerA , data);} skip;
120 E: /* fifth message */
121 atomic{messageUS.session = sessionId
122 messageUS.content1 = logout
123 network! msg5 (partnerA , messageUS);
124 network? ack (partnerA , data);
125 statusB = err; goto A} skip;
128 }
130 init {
131 atomic{
132 if
133 ::run User(); run Clock(); run Server ();
134 fi;
135 }
136 }
B: Model with intruder
1 #define MSG printf("Time is %d\n", timer)
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3 mtype = { ok , err , ack ,
4 msg1 , msg2 , msg3 , msg4 , msg5 , msg6 ,
5 sessionId , user , server , intruder ,
6 }
8 mtype = {
9 home , account , payment , confirm , logout , error ,
login
10 }
12 typedef Crypt { mtype session , content1 }
14 chan network = [0] of { mtype , /* msg# */
15 mtype , /* receiver */
16 Crypt }
18 /* global variables for verification */
19 mtype partnerA;
20 mtype partnerB;
21 mtype statusA = err
22 mtype statusB = err
23 mtype page = err
24 mtype Status = err
25 byte timer;
26 byte MAX = 10;
27 proctype Clock ()
29 {
31 do
32 :: atomic {timer < MAX -> timer ++} skip;
33 ::else -> atomic {timer == MAX} skip;
34 break
35 od;
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38 }
39 proctype Server ()
40 {
41 Crypt messageSU /* encrypted message to the user
*/
42 Crypt data /* received encrypted message
*/
43 messageSU.session = sessionId
44 messageSU.content1 = 0
45 HomePage:
46 page = home
47 atomic{network ? msg1 , partnerB (data);MSG
48 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU) ;
49 statusA = ok
50 Status = login} skip;
52 AccountPage:
53 atomic{network? msg2 , partnerB (data);MSG
55 page = account
56 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU);
57 goto PaymentPage} skip;
59 PaymentPage:
60 atomic{network? msg3 , partnerB (data);MSG
62 page = payment
63 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU);
64 goto ConfirmedPage} skip;
67 ConfirmedPage:
68 atomic{network? msg4 , partnerB (data);MSG
70 page = confirm
71 network ! ack (partnerB , messageSU)} skip;
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75 Logoutpage:
76 atomic{network? msg5 , partnerB (data);MSG
78 page = home;network ! ack (partnerB ,
messageSU);MSG
79 statusA = err
80 Status = logout; goto HomePage ;} skip;
81 }
82 proctype User()
83 {
84 Crypt messageUS /* encrypted message to Server */
85 Crypt data /* received encrypted message */
87 if
88 :: partnerA = intruder;
89 :: partnerA = server;
90 fi;
92 A: /* login message */
93 atomic{messageUS.session = sessionId
94 messageUS.content1 = login
95 network! msg1 ,partnerA , messageUS;
96 network? ack (partnerA , data);
97 statusB = ok} skip;
99 B: /* second message */
100 atomic{messageUS.session = sessionId
101 messageUS.content1 = account
102 network! msg2 (partnerA , messageUS);
103 network? ack (partnerA , data);} skip;
105 C: /* third message */
106 atomic{messageUS.session = sessionId
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107 messageUS.content1 = payment
108 network! msg3 (partnerA , messageUS);
109 network? ack (partnerA , data);} skip;
111 D: /* fourth message */
112 atomic{messageUS.session = sessionId
113 messageUS.content1 = confirm
114 network! msg4 (partnerA , messageUS);
115 network? ack (partnerA , data);} skip;
117 E: /* fifth message */
118 atomic{messageUS.session = sessionId
119 messageUS.content1 = logout
120 network! msg5 (partnerA , messageUS);
121 network? ack (partnerA , data);
122 statusB = err; goto A} skip;
124 }
126 proctype Intruder () {
127 mtype msg , recpt;
128 Crypt data , intercepted;
129 do
130 :: network ? msg , _, data ->
131 atomic{ if /* store the message */
132 :: intercepted.session = data.session;
133 intercepted.content1 = data.content1;
134 :: skip;
135 fi; }
138 if /* choose a recipient */
139 :: recpt = user;
140 :: recpt = server;
141 ::skip;
142 fi;
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143 if /* replay intercepted message or assemble it */
144 :: data.session = intercepted.session;
145 data.content1 = intercepted.content1;
147 :: if /* assemble content1 */
148 :: data.content1 = server;
149 :: data.content1 = user;
150 :: data.content1= login;
151 :: data.content1 = home;
152 :: data.content1 = account;
153 :: data.content1 = payment;
154 :: data.content1 = confirm;
155 :: data.content1 = logout;
156 ::skip;
157 fi;
159 :: if /* assemble SessionId */
160 :: data.session = sessionId;
161 ::skip;
162 fi;
163 fi;
164 network ! msg (recpt , data);
165 od
166 }
168 init {
169 atomic{
170 if
171 ::run User(); run Clock(); run Intruder (); run
Server ();
172 fi;
173 }
174 }
